功能主義 (心靈哲學)

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功能主义,也称机能主义心灵哲学中的观点之一,认为心灵状态(信念、欲望、痛苦等)都仅仅基于它们的功能角色。功能角色是,一个心灵状态与其他心灵状态(其他人的心灵)之间的关系,感官输入和行为输出。[1] 功能主义是同一理论行为主义的发展演变。

多重实现[编辑]

多重实现是功能主义的重要部分。根据标准的功能主义理论,心灵状态回应功能角色。它们像阀门一样,一个阀门可以由塑料或铁等等构成,只要它们能当作阀门来用。类似地,功能主义者认为,心灵状态也可以被解释,而不需要什么实现它们的物理的中介(例如大脑),人们只需要考虑更高层面的功能即可。

但是,也有功能主义理论与同一理论相组合,否定了多重现实。例如Functional Specification Theories (FSTs) (Levin, § 3.4)。最著名的支持这个观点的人是大卫·刘易斯[2]戴维·阿姆斯特朗英语David Malet Armstrong.[3] 根据FSTs,心灵状态是功能角色的特殊“实现者”,而不是功能角色本身。

类型[编辑]

机械状态的功能主义[编辑]

心灵功能主义[编辑]

分析功能主义[编辑]

人体功能主义[编辑]

机械功能主义[编辑]

批判[编辑]

批判这一理论的反例,可见于中文屋中文脑倒错光谱孪生地球

参见[编辑]

参考资料[编辑]

  1. ^ Block, Ned. (1996). "What is functionalism?" a revised version of the entry on functionalism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan. (PDF online 页面存档备份,存于互联网档案馆)
  2. ^ Lewis, David. (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain". In Block (1980a) Vol. 1, pp. 216–222.
  3. ^ Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP.

推荐阅读[编辑]

  • Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP.
  • Baron-Cohen S.; Leslie A.; Frith U. Does the Autistic Child Have a "Theory of Mind"?. Cognition. 1985, 21: 37–46. PMID 2934210. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8. 
  • Block, Ned. (1980a). "Introduction: What Is Functionalism?" in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Block, Ned. (1980b). "Troubles With Functionalism", in Block (1980a).
  • Block, Ned. (1994). Qualia. In S. Guttenplan (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell
  • Block, Ned. What is functionalism? (PDF). a revised version of the entry on functionalism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan. 1996 [2020-02-24]. (原始内容存档 (PDF)于2017-12-30). 
  • Block, Ned and Fodor, J. (1972). "What Psychological States Are Not". Philosophical Review 81.
  • Chalmers, David. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Crabb, B.G. (2005). "Fading and Dancing Qualia - Moving and Shaking Arguments", Deunant Books.
  • DeLancey, C. (2002). "Passionate Engines - What Emotions Reveal about the Mind and Artificial Intelligence." Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Dennett, D. (1990) Quining Qualia. In W. Lycan, (ed), Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwells
  • Levin, Janet. (2004). "Functionalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), E. Zalta (ed.). (online 页面存档备份,存于互联网档案馆)
  • Lewis, David. (1966). "An Argument for the Identity Theory". Journal of Philosophy 63.
  • Lewis, David. (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain". In Block (1980a) Vol. 1, pp. 216–222.
  • Lycan, W. (1987) Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Mandik, Pete. (1998). Fine-grained Supervience, Cognitive Neuroscience, and the Future of Functionalism.
  • Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A Computational Approach. San Francisco: Freeman & Co.
  • Polgar, T. D. Functionalism. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008 [2020-02-24]. (原始内容存档于2019-05-19). 
  • Putnam, Hilary. (1960). "Minds and Machines". Reprinted in Putnam (1975a).
  • Putnam, Hilary. (1967). "Psychological Predicates". In Art, Mind, and Religion, W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (eds.), pp. 37–48. (Later published as "The Nature of Mental States" in Putnam (1975a).
  • Putnam, Hilary. (1975a). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: CUP.
  • Searle, John. Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1980, 3 (3): 417–424. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756. 
  • Smart, J.J.C. (1959). "Sensations and Brain Processes". Philosophical Review LXVIII.

外部链接[编辑]