- Nicholas Bunnin; Jiyuan Yu. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. 15 April 2008: 92–93. ISBN 978-0-470-99721-5 （英语）.
Philosophical method [Latin onus probandi] Originating in classical Roman law, an adversary proceeding where one party tries to establish and another to rebut some charge before a neutral adjudicative tribunal. The term has come to refer to a rule concering the division of labor of argumentation. Suppose A and B represent two competing views. If A has a favorable position, B will be required to produce strong arguments to defend its less favorable position. This is to say, A sets burden of proof on B. If B cannot shift this burden, its positioin is defeated, even though it might be right. On the other hand, if B puts forward arugments that show that its position is stronger than A's, then it transfers the burden of proof to A. It is a basic rule of dealing with evidence. Normally any position that argues for or against something has the burden. For instance, because common sense usually has an intuitive appeal prior to argument, any philosophical position standing against common sense bears the burden of proof.
- Douglas Walton. Burden of Proof, Presumption and Argumentation. Cambridge University Press. 30 June 2014: 122. ISBN 978-1-107-04662-7.
Burden of proof did not seem to be an important concept in mainstream philosophy in the past because it was generally assumed that in order for an argument to be successful it has to be a conclusive argument, in some sense meaning that it proves its conclusion beyond doubt. ... Reasoning based on probability, broadly of the statisical kind was reluctantly allowed, but defeasible reasoning of the kind that only offer plausibility of a conclusion was seen as too subjective to be admitted as justification for rational acceptance. The impracticality of this view of the matter has long been implicitly recognized by law, where burden of proof is one of the most important factors in aiding courts to use reasoned argumentation at a conclusion. In typical cases of reasoning based on legal evidence, there is inconsistenncy and uncertainty in the evidence on both sides of a disputed issue, making a conclusive proof for one side an unrealistic requirements.
- Richard H. Gaskins. Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse. Yale University Press. 1992. ISBN 978-0-300-06306-6.
- Goldman, Alvin. Argumentation and Social Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy. 1994, 91 (1): 27–49. JSTOR 2940949.
- Eemeren, Frans van; Grootendorst, Rob. A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004: 60. ISBN 0521830753.
[t]here is no point in venturing to resolve a difference of opinion through an argumentative exchange of views if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point.
- Brandom, Robert. Making it Explicit. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1994: 222. ISBN 067454319X.
[t]here are sentence types that would require a great deal of work for one to get into a position to challenge, such as 'Red is a color,' 'There have been black dogs,' 'Lighting frequently precedes thunder,' and similar commonplaces. These are treated as 'free moves' by members of our speech community—they are available to just about anyone any time to use as premises, to assert unchallenged.
- Adler, Jonathan. Belief’s Own Ethics. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2002: 164–167. ISBN 0262011921.
- Herbert Keuth. The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Cambridge University Press. 2005: 271. ISBN 978-0-521-54830-4.
- atheism. Encyclopaedia Britannica（大英百科全書）. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition （大英線上英文學術版）. 2014.
An atheist who argues in this manner may also make a distinctive burden-of-proof argument. Given that God (if there is one) is by definition a very recherché reality—a reality that must be (for there to be such a reality) transcendent to the world—the burden of proof is not on the atheist to give grounds for believing that there is no reality of that order. Rather, the burden of proof is on the believer to give some evidence for God’s existence—i.e., that there is such a reality. Given what God must be, if there is a God, the theist needs to present the evidence, for such a very strange reality. He needs to show that there is more in the world than is disclosed by common experience. The empirical method, and the empirical method alone, such an atheist asserts, affords a reliable method for establishing what is in fact the case. To the claim of the theist that there are in addition to varieties of empirical facts “spiritual facts” or “transcendent facts,” such as it being the case that there is a supernatural, self-existent, eternal power, the atheist can assert that such “facts” have not been shown.外部链接存在于
- Philosophy of Religion （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Graham Oppy; N. N. Trakakis. Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Religion The History of Western Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. 11 September 2014: 305–. ISBN 978-1-317-54639-9.
- Charles Sanders Peirce; Mouton De Gruyter; Walter De Gruyter Incorporated. Mathematical Philosophy. Walter de Gruyter. 1 January 1976: 73. ISBN 978-3-11-080588-8 （英语）.
The burden of proof is strictly an affair of legal procedure, where, owing to the necessity of deciding each case one way or the other, certain rules of presumptions are adopted by courts. there is something analogous in other cases in which questions must be decided, and in which there are some recognized rules for deciding them in the absence of data. But a purely theoretical question need to be decided at all, and therefore, in such a case, there is no "burden of proof." The person who talks of it may mean to say that there is some vague improbability in the proposition he opposes, which may be true. But then he should state his argument just as it really is, so that its true force or weakness may appear. For example, a noneuclidean geometer might say that the burden of proof is upon whoever says that the sum of angels of a triangle is that of two right angles; to which his opponent will answer that it is certainly extremely near that, and that the burden of proof is upon whoever says it is not exactly so.
- J.J. Chambliss. Philosophy of Education An Encyclopedia. Routledge. 4 July 2013: 429. ISBN 978-1-136-51168-4 （英语）.
Naturalism... Criticism ...Finally, burden-of-proof claims are rarely uncontroversial, and always difficult to eastablish. It is philosophically precarious to rest one's case on a burden of proof.
- Douglas Walton. Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning. Routledge. 2013: 17–28. ISBN 113668705X （英语）.
- Dov M. Gabbay; Franz Guenthner. Handbook of Philosophical Logic: Volume 13. Springer. 2006. ISBN 1402035217 （英语）.
- Douglas Walton. Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning. Routledge. 2013. ISBN 113668705X （英语）.
- Mojtaba Kazazi. Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A Study on Evidence Before International Tribunals. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1996. ISBN 904110142X （英语）.