认知的封闭

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(重定向自認知的封閉
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科學哲學心靈哲學中,認知的封閉是指,人類的心靈是沒有能力解決一些討論了很久的哲學問題的。[1] 歐文·弗蘭納根英语Owen Flanagan把這種立場叫做非建設性自然主義新神秘主義的首提倡者柯林·麥金英语Colin McGinn[2][3]稱其爲先驗自然主義,承認解決方法可能只能由某種非人類智慧生物提出。根據麥金,難以解決的哲學問題包括心物問題人格同一性意義問題英语meaning (philosophy of language)自由意志以及知识论,無論是從先天證明的角度,還是從经验主义的立場[4]

人物[编辑]

  • 柯林·麥金
  • 哈耶克:對於弗里德里希·哈耶克,解釋心靈問題本身就是個邏輯上的矛盾,這種不完全性(心靈解釋自己的無能)是哥德尔不完备定理的一個例子。哈耶克不是自然主義不可知論者,即那些認爲科學目前不能提供身心問題解釋的人。哈耶克認爲,徹底上,這個問題就是解不開。[5]
  • 约翰·廷德尔:見John Tyndall (1871),Fragments of Science
  • 諾姆·喬姆斯基:诺姆·乔姆斯基認爲,所有認知能力都在生物學上被限制。[6]見Noam Chomsky,Language and problems of knowledge

現象和本體[编辑]

伊曼努尔·康德在《纯粹理性批判》中,認爲人類的思想不可避免地受到範疇的限制。

量的範疇 – 單一、多數、全體

質的範疇 – 實在、否定、限制
關係的範疇 – 依存性和自存性(實性和偶性)、 因果性和獨立性、協同性

模態的範疇 – 可能性英语Logical possibility或不可能性、存在或不存在、必然或偶然。

這些限制了人類的思維。可以瞭解的是現象,範疇之外不可瞭解的是本體,即物自體

新神秘主義[编辑]

變成蝙蝠會怎樣?湯瑪斯·內格爾這樣發問。 他提到了對於經驗的主觀性英语subjective character of experience認知封閉的可能性,以及其對於唯物主义还原论科学的意義。 歐文·弗拉納根英语Owen Flanagan在1991年的著作《心靈的科學》(Science of the Mind)中提到,一些當代思想家認爲意識永遠不會得到解釋。弗拉納根把他們叫做“新神秘主義者”,根據的是樂隊Question Mark and the Mysterians英语Question Mark and the Mysterians的名字[7]根據麥金,心物問題的正確答案不能被理解,深深地寫在我們的基因裏面。

显现唯物论是個類似但不同的理論,認爲人類還不夠聰明以決定“心靈與物質的關係”。[來源請求][可疑]

批判[编辑]

儘管意識的本性是複雜的,但是根據一些哲學家,這並不意味著認知的封閉性,因此,麥金的論證是錯誤的。[8][9][10]

參見[编辑]

参考资料[编辑]

  1. ^ Leslie Marsh (ed.), Hayek in Mind: Hayek's Philosophical Psychology, Emerald Group Publishing, 2011, p. xv.
  2. ^ Harris, Errol E, Reflections on the Problem of Consciousness: 51, 2006, McGinn's stance, while he denies the possibility of ever understanding the causal connection, may be regarded as "naturalistic" in the sense that he does not reject the validity of neuro-physiological theory, and does not doubt that brain activity accompanies conscious states. .
  3. ^ Ross Wilson (ed.), The Meaning of "Life" in Romantic Poetry and Poetics, Routledge, 2009, p. 88: "[McGinn] calls his stance "transcendental naturalism..."
  4. ^ McGinn, Colin. The Problem of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies. 1994, 76 (2–3): 133–56 [2020-02-25]. doi:10.1007/bf00989821. (原始内容存档于2019-12-10). it combines deep epistemic transcendence with the denial that what thus transcends is thereby non-natural. 
  5. ^ Butos, W.N. The Social Science of Hayek's The Sensory Order. Advances in [[奧地利經濟學派|]]. Emerald. 2010: 127–28 [2020-02-25]. ISBN 978-1-84950975-6. (原始内容存档于2020-08-12). 1. Explanation is delimited by the apparatus of classification (the mind)... 2. An apparatus of classification cannot explain anything more complex than itself... 3. Therefore, the mind cannot fully explain itself... 
  6. ^ Chomsky, Noam, Language and problems of knowledge: 152, 1988 .
  7. ^ Flanagan, Owen. The Science of the Mind. 麻省理工学院出版社. 1991: 313. ISBN 978-0-262-56056-6. 
  8. ^ Garvey, James. What Does McGinn Think We Cannot Know?. Analysis. July 1997, 57 (3): 196–201. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00074. Nothing he says gets him the conclusion that we cannot solve the mind-body problem, given any of these interpretations of what is cognitively closed to us 
  9. ^ Kirk, Robert. Why Shouldn't We Be Able to Solve the Mind-Body Problem?. Analysis. January 1991, 51 (1): 17–23. JSTOR 3328626. doi:10.2307/3328626. He recognizes that many will find this outrageous; and indeed I think that his reasoning is fundamentally flawed and his central thesis false. But it will be worth trying to discover what has gone wrong. 
  10. ^ Kriegel, Uriah. The new mysterianism and the thesis of cognitive closure. Acta Analytica. December 2003, 18 (1–2): 177–191. doi:10.1007/s12136-003-1020-1. it is incoherent to suppose that we cannot understand what would count as a solution to a problem we can and do understand