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安提坦戰役
夏普斯堡戰役
南北戰爭的一部分
Battle of Antietam.png
「安提坦戰役」,庫茲和艾莉森英语Kurz & Allison1878年繪製,描述了伯恩賽德橋英语Burnside's Bridge軍事行動的場景
日期1862年9月17日,​157年前​(1862-09-17
地点39°28′24″N 77°44′41″W / 39.47333°N 77.74472°W / 39.47333; -77.74472坐标39°28′24″N 77°44′41″W / 39.47333°N 77.74472°W / 39.47333; -77.74472
结果
参战方
 美國聯邦英语Union (American Civil War)  美利坚联盟国(邦聯)
指挥官与领导者
喬治·B·麥克萊倫 羅伯特·李
参战单位
波多馬克軍團[2] 北維吉尼亞軍團[3]
德克薩斯旅英语Texas Brigade
兵力
87,164人[4][5] 38,000人「參戰」[5]
伤亡与损失
12,410人
2,108人戰死
9,549人負傷
753人被俘/失蹤[6][7]
10,316人
1,567人戰死
7,752人負傷
1,018人被俘/失蹤[6][7]

安提坦戰役(英語:Battle of Antietam/ænˈttəm/),也稱夏普斯堡戰役(英語:Battle of Sharpsburg),是南北戰爭中於美國南方的一場戰役,發生於1862年9月17日的夏普斯堡英语Sharpsburg, Maryland安提坦溪英语Antietam Creek附近,交戰雙方分別是羅伯特·李將軍率領的邦聯北維吉尼亞軍團,以及喬治·B·麥克萊倫將軍指揮的聯邦英语Union (American Civil War)波多馬克軍團。這場戰役是馬里蘭會戰的一部分,也是南北戰爭東線戰場英语Eastern Theater of the American Civil War中第一場兩集團軍級別的交戰。安提坦戰役是美國軍事史上最血腥的一天,當天共有22,717人死亡、受傷或失蹤[8]

喬治·B·麥克萊倫少將英语Major general (United States)率領的聯邦軍在追擊羅伯特·李邦聯軍進入馬里蘭州後,便向後者在安提坦溪後方的防禦陣地進攻。9月17日拂曉,約瑟夫·胡克少將麾下的兵團對邦聯軍左翼發起猛烈進攻。襲擊和反擊席捲了米勒的麥田英语Miller's Cornfield,並在鄧克教堂英语Schwarzenau Brethren周圍混戰。聯邦軍對桑肯路的襲擊最終攻破了邦聯軍的中路,但聯邦軍的優勢並未擴大。下午時分,安布羅斯·伯恩賽德英语Ambrose Burnside少將率領的聯邦兵團參戰,佔領了安提坦溪上的一座石橋,並向邦聯右翼推進。在這個關鍵時刻,A·P·希爾少將麾下的邦聯師從哈波斯渡口趕來並發動突襲反擊,隨後擊退了伯恩賽德並結束了戰鬥。雖然邦聯在人數上屈於一比二的劣勢,但李將軍投入了所有的部隊,而麥克萊倫只派出不到四分之三的軍隊參戰,這讓邦聯軍得以與聯邦軍在戰場上一較高下。當日夜裡,雙方都加固了各自的防線。儘管傷亡慘重,李將軍仍於9月18日派出部隊與麥克萊倫進行小規模作戰,並將他殘存的部隊撤往波多馬克河南側[9]

儘管聯邦軍在人數上佔有優勢,但麥克萊倫的進攻還是無法達成部隊集結英语force concentration的目的,這讓李將軍能通過轉移部隊並沿著內線英语interior lines行軍來應對聯邦軍的挑戰。這就是為何麥克萊倫即便擁有足夠的預備隊(這些預備隊本可用來部署以擴大局部勝利的經驗),卻仍無法摧毀李將軍的邦聯軍。麥克萊倫堅持自己錯誤的認知,認定他在數量上寡不敵眾,這導致他在整場戰役中都過度謹慎。

麥克萊倫擋住了李將軍入侵馬里蘭的勢頭,但後者仍能不受過分謹慎的前者阻撓地將邦聯軍撤回維吉尼亞州。麥克萊倫拒絕追擊李將軍,從而導致他在11月被亞伯拉罕·林肯總統解職。雖然安提坦戰役最終在戰術上英语Tactical victory非決定性,但邦聯軍首先從戰場撤回並放棄入侵馬里蘭州,從而讓聯邦取得了戰略性勝利英语Strategic victory。這場足夠重大的勝利,讓林肯有信心發表解放奴隸宣言,該宣言透過解放邦聯各州共計超過350萬的奴隸,開始解放所有在法律上被視為美國奴隸的人。由於英法兩國在南北戰爭前就已事實上廢除奴隸制且時任政府強烈反對奴隸制,因此這個宣言阻礙了他們任何嘗試承認邦聯的潛在計畫。

背景:馬里蘭會戰[编辑]

馬里蘭會戰,1862年9月3日至15日間的部隊行動
  邦聯
  聯邦

1862年8月30日,羅伯特·李第二次馬納沙斯之役取勝,隨後其麾下的北維吉尼亞軍團約55,000人[10][11][12]於9月3日進入馬里蘭州。在成功的鼓舞下,邦聯高層打算將戰爭帶入敵方領土。李將軍對馬里蘭的入侵,是為了與同時入侵肯塔基州的布拉克斯頓·布拉格英语Braxton Bragg埃德蒙·柯比·史密斯英语Edmund Kirby Smith軍團相互呼應。後勤方面的原因也很重要,因為北維吉尼亞地區的農場已經缺乏食物了。基於1861年春天發生的巴爾的摩暴動,以及林肯總統在前往就職典禮的路上必須變相穿過巴爾的摩的事實,邦聯高層認為馬里蘭州會熱情地歡迎他們的到來。邦聯軍行軍時還唱著「馬里蘭,我的馬里蘭英语Maryland, My Maryland!」,但到了1862年秋天,馬里蘭州親聯邦的情緒壓倒了另一方的聲音,尤其該州西部更是如此。當李將軍的部隊經過州民的家門時,他們不是躲在房子裡,就是在一旁冷眼瞧著,與此相反,波多馬克軍團則是受到州民們得鼓舞與激勵。包括總統傑佛遜·戴維斯在內的部分邦聯政治人物都相信,如果他們能在聯邦領土上打一場勝仗,將會增加被外國承認的機會。這樣的勝利可能會得到英法兩國的認可及財政支持,雖然沒有證據顯示李將軍認為邦聯應該基於這種可能性制定相關的軍事計劃[13][14]

當麥克萊倫麾下87,000人[4]波多馬克軍團前去截擊李將軍時,兩位聯邦士兵[a]發現了三支雪茄,裡面裹著的正是李將軍遺失命令的副本英语Special Order 191,上面記載著邦聯詳細的戰鬥計畫。這個命令顯示出李將軍將分兵進擊哈波斯渡口黑格斯敦,並在地理上分成了數個區塊,因此如果麥克萊倫進軍迅速,可將邦聯軍孤立的各部分別擊破。麥克萊倫等了大約18個小時後才決定利用這一情報並重新部署部隊,從而浪費了一次決定性地擊敗李將軍的機會[17]

安提坦戰役前,雙方在馬里蘭會戰中進行了兩場重要的軍事行動:一是石牆傑克森少將攻佔哈波斯渡口英语Battle of Harpers Ferry,導致李將軍麾下大部因為參與聯邦軍的投降儀式,而缺席安提坦戰役初期階段;另一場則是麥克萊倫在南山之役中突襲穿越藍嶺山脈,但邦聯軍在兩隘道的堅守推遲了麥克萊倫的推進,從而使李將軍有足夠時間在夏普斯堡集結其餘部隊[18]

交戰部隊[编辑]

參戰雙方總指揮官

聯邦軍[编辑]

聯邦各軍團指揮官
戰鬥結束後,林肯總統與麥克萊倫將軍和部屬在格羅夫農場合影,著名人物包括:(左起)1.德洛士·薩克特英语Delos Bennett Sackett上校;4.喬治·W·莫雷爾英语George W. Morell將軍;5.亞歷山大·S·韋博英语Alexander S. Webb,第五軍團參謀長;6.麥克萊倫將軍;8.喬納森·萊特曼英语Jonathan Letterman醫生;10. 林肯總統;11.亨利·J·洪特英语Henry J. Hunt;12.菲茲·約翰·波特英语Fitz John Porter;15.安德魯·A·亨弗瑞斯英语Andrew A. Humphreys;16.喬治·阿姆斯壯·卡斯特團長

喬治·B·麥克萊倫少將麾下的波多馬克軍團,在吸收約翰·波普英语John Pope (military officer)維吉尼亞軍團後,增強到了六個步兵兵團[19][20]

第一兵團英语I Corps (Union Army),由約瑟夫·胡克少將指揮,下轄數個師:

第二兵團英语II Corps (Union Army),由愛德溫·V·薩姆納英语Edwin V. Sumner少將指揮,下轄數個師:

第五兵團英语V Corps (Union Army),由菲茲·約翰·波特英语Fitz John Porter少將指揮,下轄數個師:

第六兵團英语VI Corps (Union Army),由威廉·B·富蘭克林英语William B. Franklin少將指揮,下轄數個師:

第九兵團英语IX Corps (Union Army),由安布羅斯·伯恩賽德英语Ambrose E. Burnside少將(戰役期間由雅各布·道爾森·考克斯英语Jacob Dolson Cox准將下達行動命令)指揮,下轄數個師:

第十二兵團英语XII Corps (Union Army),由約瑟·K·曼斯菲爾德英语Joseph K. Mansfield少將指揮,下轄數個師:

騎兵師,由阿爾弗雷德·普萊森頓英语Alfred Pleasonton准將指揮,下轄數個旅:

邦聯軍[编辑]

邦聯各軍團指揮官

李將軍將麾下的北維吉尼亞軍團組成兩大步兵兵團[11][21]

第一兵團,由詹姆斯·隆史崔特少將指揮,下轄各

第二兵團,由石牆傑克森少將指揮,下轄各師:

其餘部隊還包括詹姆斯·尤爾·布朗·史都華少將率領的騎兵團英语Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia,以及威廉·N·彭德爾頓英语William N. Pendleton指揮的預備砲兵部隊。第二兵團的炮兵被配屬到各師當中,與第一兵團將砲兵留在兵團層級的配置不同。

戰役前奏[编辑]

軍隊部署[编辑]

1862年9月15日至16日安提坦戰場的情況
安提坦戰役概覽

9月15日,李將軍開始將他可用的兵力沿著低脊(low ridge)部署於安提坦溪後方(夏普斯堡附近)。這雖然是有效的防禦陣地,但並非堅不可摧。當地地形為步兵提供了很好的掩護,上面有鐵柵欄和石圍牆、石灰岩露出部、小凹陷及低窪地英语Swale (landform)。他們前面的小河只是一個小障礙,寬度從60英尺(18米)到100英尺(30米)不等,在某些地方是可橫渡的,並有三座兩兩相距1英里(1.6公里)的石橋橫越。但這對邦聯軍來說也是個危險的據點,因為他們的後方被波多馬克河所阻擋,如有需要時附近也僅有謝潑茲敦英语Shepherdstown, West Virginia的波特勒淺灘(Boteler's Ford)可供撤離[b]。9月15日,李將軍可直接指揮的部隊不超過一萬八千人,這樣的兵力僅僅是聯邦軍的三分之一[22]

9月15日下午,聯邦軍先頭兩個師抵達戰場,其餘大部則於當天傍晚到達。雖然聯邦軍如於9月16日早上立即攻擊將在數量上具有壓倒性的優勢,但麥克萊倫那謹慎的個性,以及相信李將軍在夏普斯堡的部隊高達十萬人,讓他將攻勢拖延至隔天[23]。這讓邦聯軍有更多時間能準備防禦陣地,並使隆史崔特的兵團及石牆傑克森的兵團[c]能分別從黑格斯敦哈波斯渡口趕抵戰場。石牆傑克森依托波多馬克河駐防左翼(戰場北方),隆史崔特則依托安提坦溪駐防右翼(戰場南方),整條防線約4英里(6公里)長[d][24]

9月16日傍晚,麥克萊倫下令胡克的第一兵團橫渡安提坦溪,並探查敵軍位置。米德部小心翼翼地襲擊了東樹林(East Woods)附近的胡德部。夜幕降臨後砲火依然持續,而麥克萊倫將他的部隊進行佈署以待隔日的戰鬥,他的計畫是壓倒敵軍左翼,而這個決定是根據安提坦溪上的橋樑配置所安排:下游的橋[e]由虛張聲勢的邦聯軍所控制,中游的橋[f]則處於夏普斯堡附近的火炮範圍下,而上游的橋距離最近的邦聯砲兵陣地約莫2英里(3.2公里),因此可從該處安全渡河。麥克萊倫計畫投入麾下一半以上的部隊,先以兩個兵團發起進攻,再由第三個兵團後續支援,如有必要甚至會投入第四個兵團。他打算以第五個兵團像邦聯右翼同時發起佯攻牽制,並於任何一邊的攻勢取得進展時,親率預備隊進攻中路[25]。雙方在東樹林的前哨戰讓李將軍得知了麥克萊倫的意圖,並依此對其防線做了相應的準備。李將軍將他的部隊轉移到左翼,並向還未抵達戰場的兩支部隊(拉法葉·麥克羅斯麾下的兩個師及A·P·希爾率領的一個師)發出緊急訊息[26][23]

地形及其後果[编辑]

麥克萊倫的計畫相當不協調,而且執行地很糟糕。他對每個下屬指揮官只發出該軍團的指令,而不是整體戰鬥計畫的通盤命令。戰場的地形也讓這些指揮官很難監視其負責區域外的情形。而且麥克萊倫的總部位於戰場後方超過一英里處(at the Philip Pry house, east of the creek),這使得他很難控管與指揮各兵團。這就是為何隔天戰鬥的進行是三場獨立且不協調的戰鬥:早上在戰場北端,正午時分在中路,而下午在南端。麥克萊倫的部隊因此缺乏協同作戰及部隊集結的能力,這幾乎完全抵消其在數量上擁有的二比一優勢,也讓李將軍能調動其守軍來應對每次攻勢[23]

戰役過程[编辑]

早上階段[编辑]

地點:戰場北端

Assaults by the I Corps, 5:30 to 7:30 a.m.

麥田[编辑]

The battle opened at dawn (about 5:30 a.m.) on September 17 with an attack down the Hagerstown Turnpike by the Union I Corps under Joseph Hooker. Hooker's objective was the plateau on which sat the Dunker Church, a modest whitewashed building belonging to a local sect of German Baptists. Hooker had approximately 8,600 men, little more than the 7,700 defenders under Stonewall Jackson, and this slight disparity was more than offset by the Confederates' strong defensive positions.[27] Abner Doubleday's division moved on Hooker's right, James Ricketts's moved on the left into the East Woods, and George Meade's Pennsylvania Reserves division deployed in the center and slightly to the rear. Jackson's defense consisted of the divisions under Alexander Lawton and John R. Jones in line from the West Woods, across the Turnpike, and along the southern end of Miller's Cornfield. Four brigades were held in reserve inside the West Woods.[28]

As the first Union men emerged from the North Woods and into the Cornfield, an artillery duel erupted. Confederate fire was from the horse artillery batteries under Jeb Stuart to the west and four batteries under Col. Stephen D. Lee on the high ground across the pike from the Dunker Church to the south. Union return fire was from nine batteries on the ridge behind the North Woods and twenty 20-pounder Parrott rifles, 2 miles (3 km) east of Antietam Creek. The conflagration caused heavy casualties on both sides and was described by Col. Lee as "artillery Hell."[29]

Seeing the glint of Confederate bayonets concealed in the Cornfield, Hooker halted his infantry and brought up four batteries of artillery, which fired shell and canister over the heads of the Federal infantry into the field. A savage battle began, with considerable melee action with rifle butts and bayonets due to short visibility in the corn. Officers rode about cursing and yelling orders no one could hear in the noise. Rifles became hot and fouled from too much firing; the air was filled with a hail of bullets and shells.[30]

Dead Confederate soldiers from Starke's Louisiana Brigade, on the Hagerstown Turnpike, north of the Dunker Church. Photograph by Alexander Gardner.

Meade's 1st Brigade of Pennsylvanians, under Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, began advancing through the East Woods and exchanged fire with Colonel James Walker's brigade of Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina troops. As Walker's men forced Seymour's back, aided by Lee's artillery fire, Ricketts's division entered the Cornfield, also to be torn up by artillery. Brig. Gen. Abram Duryée's brigade marched directly into volleys from Colonel Marcellus Douglass's Georgia brigade. Enduring heavy fire from a range of 250碼(230米) and gaining no advantage because of a lack of reinforcements, Duryée ordered a withdrawal.[28]

The reinforcements that Duryée had expected—brigades under Brig. Gen. George L. Hartsuff and Col. William A. Christian—had difficulties reaching the scene. Hartsuff was wounded by a shell, and Christian dismounted and fled to the rear in terror. When the men were rallied and advanced into the Cornfield, they met the same artillery and infantry fire as their predecessors. As the superior Union numbers began to tell, the Louisiana "Tiger" Brigade under Harry Hays entered the fray and forced the Union men back to the East Woods. The casualties received by the 12th Massachusetts Infantry, 67%, were the highest of any unit that day.[31] The Tigers were beaten back eventually when the Federals brought up a battery of 3-inch ordnance rifles and rolled them directly into the Cornfield, point-blank fire that slaughtered the Tigers, who lost 323 of their 500 men.[32]

...the most deadly fire of the war. Rifles are shot to pieces in the hands of the soldiers, canteens and haversacks are riddled with bullets, the dead and wounded go down in scores.

Captain Benjamin F. Cook of the 12th Massachusetts Infantry, on the attack by the Louisiana Tigers at the Cornfield[33]

While the Cornfield remained a bloody stalemate, Federal advances a few hundred yards to the west were more successful. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon's 4th Brigade of Doubleday's division (recently named the Iron Brigade) began advancing down and astride the turnpike, into the cornfield, and in the West Woods, pushing aside Jackson's men.[34] They were halted by a charge of 1,150 men from Starke's brigade, leveling heavy fire from 30碼(30米) away. The Confederate brigade withdrew after being exposed to fierce return fire from the Iron Brigade, and Starke was mortally wounded.[35] The Union advance on the Dunker Church resumed and cut a large gap in Jackson's defensive line, which teetered near collapse. Although the cost was steep, Hooker's corps was making steady progress.

Confederate reinforcements arrived just after 7 a.m. The divisions under McLaws and Richard H. Anderson arrived following a night march from Harpers Ferry. Around 7:15, General Lee moved George T. Anderson's Georgia brigade from the right flank of the army to aid Jackson. At 7 a.m., Hood's division of 2,300 men advanced through the West Woods and pushed the Union troops back through the Cornfield again. The Texans attacked with particular ferocity because as they were called from their reserve position they were forced to interrupt the first hot breakfast they had had in days. They were aided by three brigades of D.H. Hill's division arriving from the Mumma Farm, southeast of the Cornfield, and by Jubal Early's brigade, pushing through the West Woods from the Nicodemus Farm, where they had been supporting Jeb Stuart's horse artillery. Some officers of the Iron Brigade rallied men around the artillery pieces of Battery B, 4th U.S. Artillery, and Gibbon himself saw to it that his previous unit did not lose a single caisson.[36] Hood's men bore the brunt of the fighting, however, and paid a heavy price—60% casualties—but they were able to prevent the defensive line from crumbling and held off the I Corps. When asked by a fellow officer where his division was, Hood replied, "Dead on the field."[37]

Hooker's men had also paid heavily but without achieving their objectives. After two hours and 2,500 casualties, they were back where they started. The Cornfield, an area about 250碼(230米) deep and 400碼(400米) wide, was a scene of indescribable destruction. It was estimated that the Cornfield changed hands no fewer than 15 times in the course of the morning.[38] Major Rufus R. Dawes, who assumed command of Iron Brigade's 6th Wisconsin Regiment during the battle, later compared the fighting around the Hagerstown Turnpike with the stone wall at Fredericksburg, Spotsylvania's "Bloody Angle", and the slaughter pen of Cold Harbor, insisting that "the Antietam Turnpike surpassed them all in manifest evidence of slaughter."[39] Hooker called for support from the 7,200 men of Mansfield's XII Corps.

... every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the [Confederates] slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker[30]
Assaults by the XII Corps, 7:30 to 9:00 a.m.

Half of Mansfield's men were raw recruits, and Mansfield was also inexperienced, having taken command only two days before. Although he was a veteran of 40 years' service, he had never led large numbers of soldiers in combat. Concerned that his men would bolt under fire, he marched them in a formation that was known as "column of companies, closed in mass," a bunched-up formation in which a regiment was arrayed ten ranks deep instead of the normal two. As his men entered the East Woods, they presented an excellent artillery target, "almost as good a target as a barn." Mansfield himself was shot in the chest and died the next day. Alpheus Williams assumed temporary command of the XII Corps.[40][41]

The new recruits of Mansfield's 1st Division made no progress against Hood's line, which was reinforced by brigades of D.H. Hill's division under Colquitt and McRae. The 2nd Division of the XII Corps, under George Sears Greene, however, broke through McRae's men, who fled under the mistaken belief that they were about to be trapped by a flanking attack. This breach of the line forced Hood and his men, outnumbered, to regroup in the West Woods, where they had started the day.[31] Greene was able to reach the Dunker Church, Hooker's original objective, and drove off Stephen Lee's batteries. Federal forces held most of the ground to the east of the turnpike.

Hooker attempted to gather the scattered remnants of his I Corps to continue the assault, but a Confederate sharpshooter spotted the general's conspicuous white horse and shot Hooker through the foot. Command of his I Corps fell to General Meade, since Hooker's senior subordinate, James B. Ricketts, had also been wounded. But with Hooker removed from the field, there was no general left with the authority to rally the men of the I and XII Corps. Greene's men came under heavy fire from the West Woods and withdrew from the Dunker Church.

The Dunker Church after September 17, 1862. Here, both Union and Confederate dead lie together on the field.

In an effort to turn the Confederate left flank and relieve the pressure on Mansfield's men, Sumner's II Corps was ordered at 7:20 a.m. to send two divisions into battle. Sedgwick's division of 5,400 men was the first to ford the Antietam, and they entered the East Woods with the intention of turning left and forcing the Confederates south into the assault of Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps. But the plan went awry. They became separated from William H. French's division, and at 9 a.m. Sumner, who was accompanying the division, launched the attack with an unusual battle formation—the three brigades in three long lines, men side-by-side, with only 50 to 70碼(60米) separating the lines. They were assaulted first by Confederate artillery and then from three sides by the divisions of Early, Walker, and McLaws, and in less than half an hour Sedgwick's men were forced to retreat in great disorder to their starting point with over 2,200 casualties, including Sedgwick himself, who was taken out of action for several months by a wound.[42][43][44][45] Sumner has been condemned by most historians for his "reckless" attack, his lack of coordination with the I and XII Corps headquarters, losing control of French's division when he accompanied Sedgwick's, failing to perform adequate reconnaissance prior to launching his attack, and selecting the unusual battle formation that was so effectively flanked by the Confederate counterattack. Historian M. V. Armstrong's recent scholarship, however, has determined that Sumner did perform appropriate reconnaissance and his decision to attack where he did was justified by the information available to him.[46]

The final actions in the morning phase of the battle were around 10 a.m., when two regiments of the XII Corps advanced, only to be confronted by the division of John G. Walker, newly arrived from the Confederate right. They fought in the area between the Cornfield in the West Woods, but soon Walker's men were forced back by two brigades of Greene's division, and the Federal troops seized some ground in the West Woods.

The morning phase ended with casualties on both sides of almost 13,000, including two Union corps commanders.[47]

正午階段[编辑]

地點:邦聯中路戰線

桑肯路:「血腥之道」(Sunken Road: "Bloody Lane")[编辑]

Assaults by the XII and II Corps, 9 a.m. to 1 p.m.

By midday, the action had shifted to the center of the Confederate line. Sumner had accompanied the morning attack of Sedgwick's division, but another of his divisions, under French, lost contact with Sumner and Sedgwick and inexplicably headed south. Eager for an opportunity to see combat, French found skirmishers in his path and ordered his men forward. By this time, Sumner's aide (and son) located French, described the terrible fighting in the West Woods and relayed an order for him to divert Confederate attention by attacking their center.[48]

French confronted D.H. Hill's division. Hill commanded about 2,500 men, less than half the number under French, and three of his five brigades had been torn up during the morning combat. This sector of Longstreet's line was theoretically the weakest. But Hill's men were in a strong defensive position, atop a gradual ridge, in a sunken road worn down by years of wagon traffic, which formed a natural trench.[49]

French launched a series of brigade-sized assaults against Hill's improvised breastworks at around 9:30 a.m.. The first brigade to attack, mostly inexperienced troops commanded by Brig. Gen. Max Weber, was quickly cut down by heavy rifle fire; neither side deployed artillery at this point. The second attack, more raw recruits under Col. Dwight Morris, was also subjected to heavy fire but managed to beat back a counterattack by the Alabama Brigade of Robert Rodes. The third, under Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, included three veteran regiments, but they also fell to fire from the sunken road. French's division suffered 1,750 casualties (of his 5,700 men) in under an hour.[50]

Reinforcements were arriving on both sides, and by 10:30 a.m. Robert E. Lee sent his final reserve division—some 3,400 men under Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson—to bolster Hill's line and extend it to the right, preparing an attack that would envelop French's left flank. But at the same time, the 4,000 men of Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson's division arrived on French's left. This was the last of Sumner's three divisions, which had been held up in the rear by McClellan as he organized his reserve forces.[51] Richardson's fresh troops struck the first blow.

Sunken Road

Leading off the fourth attack of the day against the sunken road was the Irish Brigade of Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher. As they advanced with emerald green flags snapping in the breeze, a regimental chaplain, Father William Corby, rode back and forth across the front of the formation shouting words of conditional absolution prescribed by the Roman Catholic Church for those who were about to die. (Corby would later perform a similar service at Gettysburg in 1863.) The mostly Irish immigrants lost 540 men to heavy volleys before they were ordered to withdraw.[52]

Gen. Richardson personally dispatched the brigade of Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell into battle around noon (after being told that Caldwell was in the rear, behind a haystack), and finally the tide turned. Anderson's Confederate division had been little help to the defenders after Gen. Anderson was wounded early in the fighting. Other key leaders were lost as well, including George B. Anderson (no relation; Anderson's successor, Col. Charles C. Tew of the 2nd North Carolina, was killed minutes after assuming command)[53] and Col. John B. Gordon of the 6th Alabama. (Gordon received 5 serious wounds in the fight, twice in his right leg, twice in the left arm, and once in the face. He lay unconscious, face down in his cap, and later told colleagues that he should have smothered in his own blood, except for the act of an unidentified Yankee, who had earlier shot a hole in his cap, which allowed the blood to drain.)[54] Rodes was wounded in the thigh but was still on the field. These losses contributed directly to the confusion of the following events.

We were shooting them like sheep in a pen. If a bullet missed the mark at first it was liable to strike the further bank, angle back, and take them secondarily.

Sergeant of the 61st New York[55]

As Caldwell's brigade advanced around the right flank of the Confederates, Col. Francis C. Barlow and 350 men of the 61st and 64th New York saw a weak point in the line and seized a knoll commanding the sunken road. This allowed them to get enfilade fire into the Confederate line, turning it into a deadly trap. In attempting to wheel around to meet this threat, a command from Rodes was misunderstood by Lt. Col. James N. Lightfoot, who had succeeded the unconscious John Gordon. Lightfoot ordered his men to about-face and march away, an order that all five regiments of the brigade thought applied to them as well. Confederate troops streamed toward Sharpsburg, their line lost.

The Bloody Lane in 2005

Richardson's men were in hot pursuit when massed artillery hastily assembled by Gen. Longstreet drove them back. A counterattack with 200 men led by D.H. Hill got around the Federal left flank near the sunken road, and although they were driven back by a fierce charge of the 5th New Hampshire, this stemmed the collapse of the center. Reluctantly, Richardson ordered his division to fall back to north of the ridge facing the sunken road. His division lost about 1,000 men. Col. Barlow was severely wounded, and Richardson mortally wounded.[56] Winfield S. Hancock assumed division command. Although Hancock would have an excellent future reputation as an aggressive division and corps commander, the unexpected change of command sapped the momentum of the Federal advance.[57]

Confederate dead lie in the "Bloody Lane" after the Battle of Antietam, 1862.

The carnage from 9:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on the sunken road gave it the name Bloody Lane, leaving about 5,600 casualties (Union 3,000, Confederate 2,600) along the 800-碼(700-米) road. And yet a great opportunity presented itself. If this broken sector of the Confederate line were exploited, Lee's army would have been divided in half and possibly defeated. There were ample forces available to do so. There was a reserve of 3,500 cavalry and the 10,300 infantrymen of Gen. Porter's V Corps, waiting near the middle bridge, a mile away. The VI Corps, under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, had just arrived with 12,000 men. Franklin was ready to exploit this breakthrough, but Sumner, the senior corps commander, ordered him not to advance. Franklin appealed to McClellan, who left his headquarters in the rear to hear both arguments but backed Sumner's decision, ordering Franklin and Hancock to hold their positions.[58]

Later in the day, the commander of the other reserve unit near the center, the V Corps, Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, heard recommendations from Maj. Gen. George Sykes, commanding his 2nd Division, that another attack be made in the center, an idea that intrigued McClellan. However, Porter is said to have told McClellan, "Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic." McClellan demurred and another opportunity was lost.[59]

下午階段[编辑]

地點:戰場南端

「伯恩賽德橋」[编辑]

Assaults by the IX Corps, 10 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

The action moved to the southern end of the battlefield. McClellan's plan called for Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside and the IX Corps to conduct a diversionary attack in support of Hooker's I Corps, hoping to draw Confederate attention away from the intended main attack in the north. However, Burnside was instructed to wait for explicit orders before launching his attack, and those orders did not reach him until 10 a.m.[60] Burnside was strangely passive during preparations for the battle. He was disgruntled that McClellan had abandoned the previous arrangement of "wing" commanders reporting to him. Previously, Burnside had commanded a wing that included both the I and IX Corps and now he was responsible only for the IX Corps. Implicitly refusing to give up his higher authority, Burnside treated first Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno (killed at South Mountain) and then Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox of the Kanawha Division as the corps commander, funneling orders to the corps through him.

Burnside had four divisions (12,500 troops) and 50 guns east of Antietam Creek. Facing him was a force that had been greatly depleted by Lee's movement of units to bolster the Confederate left flank. At dawn, the divisions of Brig. Gens. David R. Jones and John G. Walker stood in defense, but by 10 a.m. all of Walker's men and Col. George T. Anderson's Georgia brigade had been removed. Jones had only about 3,000 men and 12 guns available to meet Burnside. Four thin brigades guarded the ridges near Sharpsburg, primarily a low plateau known as Cemetery Hill. The remaining 400 men—the 2nd and 20th Georgia regiments, under the command of Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs, with two artillery batteries—defended Rohrbach's Bridge, a three-span, 125-foot (38 m) stone structure that was the southernmost crossing of the Antietam.[61] It would become known to history as Burnside's Bridge because of the notoriety of the coming battle. The bridge was a difficult objective. The road leading to it ran parallel to the creek and was exposed to enemy fire. The bridge was dominated by a 100-foot (30 m) high wooded bluff on the west bank, strewn with boulders from an old quarry, making infantry and sharpshooter fire from good covered positions a dangerous impediment to crossing.

Go and look at [Burnside's Bridge], and tell me if you don't think Burnside and his corps might have executed a hop, skip, and jump and landed on the other side. One thing is certain, they might have waded it that day without getting their waist belts wet in any place.

Confederate staff officer Henry Kyd Douglas[62]

Antietam Creek in this sector was seldom more than 50 feet (15 m) wide, and several stretches were only waist deep and out of Confederate range. Burnside has been widely criticized for ignoring this fact.[62] However, the commanding terrain across the sometimes shallow creek made crossing the water a comparatively easy part of a difficult problem. Burnside concentrated his plan instead on storming the bridge while simultaneously crossing a ford McClellan's engineers had identified a half mile (1 km) downstream, but when Burnside's men reached it, they found the banks too high to negotiate. While Col. George Crook's Ohio brigade prepared to attack the bridge with the support of Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis's division, the rest of the Kanawha Division and Brig. Gen. Isaac Rodman's division struggled through thick brush trying to locate Snavely's Ford, 2 miles (3 km) downstream, intending to flank the Confederates.[63][61][64]

Crook's assault on the bridge was led by skirmishers from the 11th Connecticut, who were ordered to clear the bridge for the Ohioans to cross and assault the bluff. After receiving punishing fire for 15 minutes, the Connecticut men withdrew with 139 casualties, one-third of their strength, including their commander, Col. Henry W. Kingsbury, who was fatally wounded.[65] Crook's main assault went awry when his unfamiliarity with the terrain caused his men to reach the creek a quarter mile (400 m) upstream from the bridge, where they exchanged volleys with Confederate skirmishers for the next few hours.[66]

While Rodman's division was out of touch, slogging toward Snavely's Ford, Burnside and Cox directed a second assault at the bridge by one of Sturgis's brigades, led by the 2nd Maryland and 6th New Hampshire. They also fell prey to the Confederate sharpshooters and artillery, and their attack fell apart.[67] By this time it was noon, and McClellan was losing patience. He sent a succession of couriers to motivate Burnside to move forward. He ordered one aide, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now." He increased the pressure by sending his inspector general, Col. Delos B. Sackett, to confront Burnside, who reacted indignantly: "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders."[68]

The third attempt to take the bridge was at 12:30 p.m. by Sturgis's other brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero. It was led by the 51st New York and the 51st Pennsylvania, who, with adequate artillery support and a promise that a recently canceled whiskey ration would be restored if they were successful, charged downhill and took up positions on the east bank. Maneuvering a captured light howitzer into position, they fired double canister down the bridge and got within 25碼(23米) of the enemy. By 1 p.m., Confederate ammunition was running low, and word reached Toombs that Rodman's men were crossing Snavely's Ford on their flank. He ordered a withdrawal. His Georgians had cost the Federals more than 500 casualties, giving up fewer than 160 themselves. And they had stalled Burnside's assault on the southern flank for more than three hours.[69][70]

Burnside's assault stalled again on its own. His officers had neglected to transport ammunition across the bridge, which was itself becoming a bottleneck for soldiers, artillery, and wagons. This represented another two-hour delay. Gen. Lee used this time to bolster his right flank. He ordered up every available artillery unit, although he made no attempt to strengthen D.R. Jones's badly outnumbered force with infantry units from the left. Instead, he counted on the arrival of A.P. Hill's Light Division, currently embarked on an exhausting 17 mile (27 km) march from Harpers Ferry. By 2 p.m., Hill's men had reached Boteler's Ford, and Hill was able to confer with the relieved Lee at 2:30, who ordered him to bring up his men to the right of Jones.[71]

The Federals were completely unaware that 3,000 new men would be facing them. Burnside's plan was to move around the weakened Confederate right flank, converge on Sharpsburg, and cut Lee's army off from Boteler's Ford, their only escape route across the Potomac. At 3 p.m., Burnside left Sturgis's division in reserve on the west bank and moved west with over 8,000 troops (most of them fresh) and 22 guns for close support.[72]

An initial assault led by the 79th New York "Cameron Highlanders" succeeded against Jones's outnumbered division, which was pushed back past Cemetery Hill and to within 200碼(200米) of Sharpsburg. Farther to the left, Rodman's division advanced toward Harpers Ferry Road. Its lead brigade, under Col. Harrison Fairchild, containing several colorful Zouaves of the 9th New York, commanded by Col. Rush Hawkins, came under heavy shellfire from a dozen enemy guns mounted on a ridge to their front, but they kept pushing forward. There was panic in the streets of Sharpsburg, clogged with retreating Confederates. Of the five brigades in Jones's division, only Toombs's brigade was still intact, but he had only 700 men.[73]

A. P. Hill's division arrived at 3:30 p.m. Hill divided his column, with two brigades moving southeast to guard his flank and the other three, about 2,000 men, moving to the right of Toombs's brigade and preparing for a counterattack. At 3:40 p.m., Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg's brigade of South Carolinians attacked the 16th Connecticut on Rodman's left flank in the cornfield of farmer John Otto. The Connecticut men had been in service for only three weeks, and their line disintegrated with 185 casualties. The 4th Rhode Island came up on the right, but they had poor visibility amid the high stalks of corn, and they were disoriented because many of the Confederates were wearing Union uniforms captured at Harpers Ferry. They also broke and ran, leaving the 8th Connecticut far out in advance and isolated. They were enveloped and driven down the hills toward Antietam Creek. A counterattack by regiments from the Kanawha Division fell short.[74]

The IX Corps had suffered casualties of about 20% but still possessed twice the number of Confederates confronting them. Unnerved by the collapse of his flank, Burnside ordered his men all the way back to the west bank of the Antietam, where he urgently requested more men and guns. McClellan was able to provide just one battery. He said, "I can do nothing more. I have no infantry." In fact, however, McClellan had two fresh corps in reserve, Porter's V and Franklin's VI, but he was too cautious, concerned he was greatly outnumbered and that a massive counterstrike by Lee was imminent. Burnside's men spent the rest of the day guarding the bridge they had suffered so much to capture.[75]

後續發展[编辑]

Confederate dead gathered for burial after the battle.[76] Photograph by Alexander Gardner.
Photograph by Alexander Gardner of Lincoln and McClellan near the Antietam battlefield, October 3, 1862

The battle was over by 5:30 p.m. On the morning of September 18, Lee's army prepared to defend against a Federal assault that never came. After an improvised truce for both sides to recover and exchange their wounded, Lee's forces began withdrawing across the Potomac that evening to return to Virginia.[77] Losses from the battle were heavy on both sides. The Union had 12,410 casualties with 2,108 dead.[6] Confederate casualties were 10,316 with 1,546 dead.[7][78] This represented 25% of the Federal force and 31% of the Confederates. Overall, both sides lost a combined total of 22,720 casualties in a single day, almost the same amount as the number of losses that had shocked the nation at the 2-day Battle of Shiloh five months earlier.[79] Of the other casualties, 1,910 Union and 1,550 Confederate troops died of their wounds soon after the battle, while 225 Union and 306 Confederate troops listed as missing were later confirmed as dead. Several generals died as a result of the battle, including Maj. Gens. Joseph K. Mansfield and Israel B. Richardson and Brig. Gen. Isaac P. Rodman on the Union side, and Brig. Gens. Lawrence O. Branch and William E. Starke on the Confederate side.[80] Confederate Brig. Gen. George B. Anderson was shot in the ankle during the defense of the Bloody Lane. He survived the battle but died later in October after an amputation.[54] The fighting on September 17, 1862, killed 7,650 American soldiers.[81] More Americans died in battle on September 17, 1862, than on any other day in the nation's history. Antietam is sometimes cited as the bloodiest day in all of American history, but the deaths from the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 are significantly higher.[來源請求] The bloodiest battle in American history was Gettysburg, but its more than 46,000 casualties occurred over three days. Antietam ranks fifth in terms of total casualties in Civil War battles, falling behind Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Chancellorsville, and Spotsylvania Court House.

President Lincoln was disappointed in McClellan's performance. He believed that McClellan's overly cautious and poorly coordinated actions in the field had forced the battle to a draw rather than a crippling Confederate defeat.[82] The president was even more astonished that from September 17 to October 26, despite repeated entreaties from the War Department and the president himself, McClellan declined to pursue Lee across the Potomac, citing shortages of equipment and the fear of overextending his forces. General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck wrote in his official report, "The long inactivity of so large an army in the face of a defeated foe, and during the most favorable season for rapid movements and a vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disappointment and regret."[83] Lincoln relieved McClellan of his command of the Army of the Potomac on November 5, effectively ending the general's military career. He was replaced on November 9 by General Burnside.[84]

外部视频链接
Presentation by James McPherson on Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, September 11, 2008, C-SPAN

Some students of history question the designation of "strategic victory" for the Union. After all, it can be argued that McClellan performed poorly in the campaign and the battle itself, and Lee displayed great generalship in holding his own in battle against an army that greatly outnumbered his. Casualties were comparable on both sides, although Lee lost a higher percentage of his army. Lee withdrew from the battlefield first, the technical definition of the tactical loser in a Civil War battle. However, in a strategic sense, despite being a tactical draw, Antietam is considered a turning point of the war and a victory for the Union because it ended Lee's strategic campaign (his first invasion of Union territory). American historian James M. McPherson summed up the importance of the Battle of Antietam in his book, Crossroads of Freedom:

No other campaign and battle in the war had such momentous, multiple consequences as Antietam. In July 1863 the dual Union triumphs at Gettysburg and Vicksburg struck another blow that blunted a renewed Confederate offensive in the East and cut off the western third of the Confederacy from the rest. In September 1864 Sherman's capture of Atlanta electrified the North and set the stage for the final drive to Union victory. These also were pivotal moments. But they would never have happened if the triple Confederate offensives in Mississippi, Kentucky, and most of all Maryland had not been defeated in the fall of 1862.[85]

The results of Antietam also allowed President Lincoln to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, which gave Confederate states until January 1, 1863, to return or else lose their slaves. Although Lincoln had intended to do so earlier, he was advised by his Cabinet to make this announcement after a Union victory to avoid the perception that it was issued out of desperation.

The Union victory and Lincoln's proclamation played a considerable role in dissuading the governments of France and Britain from recognizing the Confederacy; some suspected they were planning to do so in the aftermath of another Union defeat. When the issue of emancipation was linked to the progress of the war, neither government had the political will to oppose the United States, since it linked support of the Confederacy to support for slavery. Both countries had already abolished slavery, and the public would not have tolerated the government militarily supporting a sovereignty upholding the ideals of slavery.[86]

戰場保存[编辑]

The battle is commemorated at Antietam National Battlefield. Conservation work undertaken by Antietam National Battlefield and private groups, has earned Antietam a reputation as one of the nation's best preserved Civil War battlefields. Few visual intrusions mar the landscape, letting visitors experience the site nearly as it was in 1862.[87]

Antietam was one of the first five Civil War battlefields preserved federally, receiving that distinction on August 30, 1890. The U.S. War Department also placed over 300 tablets at that time to mark the spots of individual regiments and of significant phases in the battle. The battlefield was transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1933. The Antietam National Battlefield now consists of 2,743 acres.

The Civil War Trust (a division of the American Battlefield Trust) and its partners have acquired and preserved 316 acres of the Antietam Battlefield.[88] In 2015, the Trust saved 44.4 acres in the heart of the battlefield, between the Cornfield and the Dunker Church, when it purchased the Wilson farm for about $1 million.[89] The preservation organization has since removed the postwar house and barn that stood on the property along Hagerstown Pike and returned the land to its wartime appearance.[90]

歷史照片和繪畫[编辑]

Mathew Brady's gallery, "The Dead of Antietam" (1862)[编辑]

On September 19, 1862, two days after the Battle of Antietam, Mathew Brady sent photographer Alexander Gardner and his assistant James Gibson[91] to photograph the carnage. In October 1862 Brady displayed the photos by Gardner in an exhibition entitled "The Dead of Antietam" at Brady's New York gallery. Many images in this presentation were graphic photographs of corpses, a presentation new to America. This was the first time that many Americans saw the realities of war in photographs as distinct from previous "artists' impressions".[92] The New York Times published a review on October 20, 1862, describing how, "Of all objects of horror one would think the battle-field should stand preeminent, that it should bear away the palm of repulsiveness." But crowds came to the gallery drawn by a "terrible fascination" to the images of mangled corpses which brought the reality of remote battle fields to New Yorkers. Viewers examined details using a magnifying glass. "We would scarce choose to be in the gallery, when one of the women bending over them should recognize a husband, a son, or a brother in the still, lifeless lines of bodies, that lie ready for the gaping trenches."[93]

Captain James Hope murals[编辑]

Captain James Hope of the 2nd Vermont Infantry, a professional artist, painted five large murals based on battlefield scenes he had sketched during the Battle of Antietam. He had been assigned to sideline duties as a scout and mapmaker due to his injuries. The canvasses were exhibited in his gallery in Watkins Glen, New York, until his death in 1892. He had prints made of these larger paintings and sold the reproductions. In the 1930s his work was damaged in a flood. The original murals were shown in a church for many years. In 1979, the National Park Service purchased and restored them.[94][95] They were featured in a 1984 Time-Life book entitled The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam.[96]

圖集[编辑]

The images below include photographs by Alexander Gardner, who was employed by Mathew Brady and whose photographs were exhibited in Brady's New York gallery in October 1862, and the murals by Captain James Hope restored by the National Park Service.

公眾文化[编辑]

The Battle of Antietam was featured at the beginning of the film Glory (1989), directed by Edward Zwick and starring Matthew Broderick, Denzel Washington, Cary Elwes, and Morgan Freeman. The scene depicts the wounding of Captain Robert Gould Shaw of Massachusetts.[103][104]

The Massachusetts-based ink manufacturer Noodler's[105] carries an ink called Antietam. The colour is a reddish brown.

參見[编辑]

註解[编辑]

  1. ^ 第27印第安那志願步兵團的巴頓·米切爾(英語:Barton W. Mitchell)下士及約翰·M·布洛斯英语John M. Bloss一級中士英语First Sergeant[15][16]
  2. ^ 位於夏普斯堡西北方10英里(16公里)的威廉斯波特 (馬里蘭州)淺灘,已被石牆傑克森用於進軍哈波斯渡口。聯邦軍在戰役的部屬使得邦聯軍從該方向撤退變得不切實際。
  3. ^ 不含A·P·希爾的師
  4. ^ 隨著戰役的進行及李將軍的調度,這些兵團的邊界有時會互相重疊。
  5. ^ 隨後將被命名為伯恩賽德橋
  6. ^ 位於自邦斯伯勒英语Boonsboro, Maryland來的路上

參考[编辑]

  1. ^ NPS; see the discussion of "strategic victory" in the Aftermath section.
  2. ^ 更多資訊: Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Part 1, pp. 169–80.
  3. ^ 更多資訊: Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Part 1, pp. 803–10.
  4. ^ 4.0 4.1 更多資訊: Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding the Army of the Potomac, of operations August 14 – November 9 (Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Part 1, p. 67).
  5. ^ 5.0 5.1 Eicher, p. 363,指出聯邦部隊有75,500人。
    Sears, p. 173,則指出聯邦部隊有75,000人,其中有效戰力為71,500人及300門火砲;p. 296,他指出聯邦傷亡12,401人占了所有參戰部隊的四分之一,且麥克萊倫承認真正參戰的部隊「僅有50,000名步兵及砲兵」;p. 389,他指出邦聯有效戰力「僅僅稍微超過38,000人」,這當中包含下午才抵達戰場的A·P·希爾師。
    Priest, p. 343,則寫出波多馬克軍團共有87,164人,其中有53,632人參戰,而北維吉尼亞軍團則有30,646人參戰。
    Luvaas and Nelson, p. 302,指出聯邦有87,100人參戰,而邦聯則有51,800人參戰。
    Harsh, Sounding the Shallows, pp. 201–02,分析了人物的史學,並顯示Ezra A. Carman(一位影響其他部分來源的戰場歷史學家)使用了「參戰」人物;共有38,000名士兵,但不包括潘德(Pender)旅和菲爾德(Field)旅(這些部隊約半數是砲兵),以及用於確保戰線後方目標的部隊。
  6. ^ 6.0 6.1 6.2 更多資訊: Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Part 1, pp. 189–204.
  7. ^ 7.0 7.1 7.2 根據Sears, pp. 294–96顯示,雙方的傷亡人數分別為:
    聯邦:共12,410人(2,108人戰死、9,549人負傷、753人被俘/失蹤);
    邦聯:共10,316人(1,546人戰死、7,752人負傷、1,018人被俘/失蹤)
    Sears指出:「毫無疑問,被列入失踪名單的1,771人中有許多人實際上已經戰死,被埋葬在下落不明的墳墓中。(there is no doubt that a good many of the 1,771 men listed as missing were in fact dead, buried uncounted in unmarked graves where they fell.)」
    Cannan, p. 201.指出邦聯的傷亡人數是估計值,因為回報的人數有包含南山之役謝潑茲敦戰役英语Battle of Shepherdstown的傷亡人數而未做區分;
    McPherson, p. 129,給出邦聯損失人數的範圍: 1,546–2,700人戰死、7,752–9,024人負傷。他也指出雙方傷兵中,共計有超過2,000人最後因傷重而死。
    Priest, p. 343,回報聯邦傷亡人數為12,882人(2,157人戰死、9,716人負傷、1,009人失蹤或被俘),而邦聯傷亡人數則是11,530人(1,754人戰死、8,649人負傷、1,127人失蹤或被俘)
    Luvaas and Nelson, p. 302,引述聯邦傷亡人數為12,469人(2,010人戰死、9,416人負傷、1,043人失蹤或被俘),而邦聯傷亡人數則是10,292人(9月14日–20日間,1,567人戰死、8,725人負傷、加上約2,000人失蹤或被俘)
  8. ^ McPherson 2002, p. 3.
  9. ^ NPS.
  10. ^ McPherson 2002, p. 100.
  11. ^ 11.0 11.1 Eicher 2001, p. 337.
  12. ^ Sears, p. 69 "perhaps 50,000".
  13. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 65–66.
  14. ^ McPherson 2002, pp. 88–89.
  15. ^ Sears 1983, p. 112.
  16. ^ McPherson 2002, p. 108.
  17. ^ McPherson 2002, p. 109.
  18. ^ McPherson 2002, pp. 110–12.
  19. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 359–66.
  20. ^ Welcher, pp. 786–88; Eicher, p. 338.
  21. ^ O.R. Series 1, Vol. XIX part 2 (S# 28), p. 621; Luvaas and Nelson, pp. 294–300; Esposito, map 67; Sears, pp. 366–72. 儘管包括官方記錄英语Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies在內的大多數歷史文件都將這些組織稱為「軍團(Corps)」,但實際上一直到馬里蘭戰役之後的1862年11月6日,這些組織才被正式指定。1862年的大部分時間裡,隆史崔特的部隊被稱為右翼,而石牆傑克森的部隊則被稱為左翼。(Gen. Lee referred in official correspondence to these as "commands". See, for instance, Luvaas and Nelson, p. 4. Lee used this term because a Confederate law forbade the creation of army corps. It had been intended as a states' rights measure to ensure that governors would retain some control over the troops from their state, and Lee lobbied strongly for repeal of this law.) Harsh, Sounding the Shallows, pp. 32–90, states that D.H. Hill was temporarily in command of a "Center Wing" with his own division commanded initially by Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, and the divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker. The other references list him strictly as a division commander.
  22. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 60.
  23. ^ 23.0 23.1 23.2 Sears 1983, p. 174.
  24. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 164, 175–76.
  25. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 63.
  26. ^ Harsh, Taken at the Flood, pp. 366–67
  27. ^ Sears 1983, p. 181.
  28. ^ 28.0 28.1 Wolff 2000, p. 60.
  29. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 190–91.
  30. ^ 30.0 30.1 Bailey 1984, p. 70.
  31. ^ 31.0 31.1 Wolff 2000, p. 61.
  32. ^ Bailey 1984, pp. 71–73.
  33. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 71.
  34. ^ Dawes 1999, pp. 88–91.
  35. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 75.
  36. ^ Dawes 1999, pp. 91–93.
  37. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 79.
  38. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 91.
  39. ^ Dawes 1999, p. 95.
  40. ^ Bailey 1984, pp. 79–80.
  41. ^ Sears 1983, p. 206.
  42. ^ Armstrong 2002, pp. 3–27.
  43. ^ Eicher 2001, pp. 353–55.
  44. ^ Wolff 2000, pp. 61–62.
  45. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 221–30.
  46. ^ Armstrong 2002, pp. 39–55.
  47. ^ Kennedy, p. 120.
  48. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 93.
  49. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 94.
  50. ^ Wolff 2000, p. 63.
  51. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 99.
  52. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 100.
  53. ^ Bailey 1984, pp. 101–03.
  54. ^ 54.0 54.1 Sears 1983, p. 242.
  55. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 102.
  56. ^ Sears 1983, p. 254.
  57. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 108.
  58. ^ Bailey 1984, pp. 108–09.
  59. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 141.
  60. ^ Jamieson, p. 94. McClellan issued the order at 9:10, after the repulse of Hooker's and Mansfield's assaults, having waited for the VI Corps to reach the battlefield and take up a reserve position.
  61. ^ 61.0 61.1 Wolff 2000, p. 64.
  62. ^ 62.0 62.1 Douglas 1940, p. 172.
  63. ^ Eicher 2001, pp. 359–60.
  64. ^ Sears 1983, p. 260.
  65. ^ Tucker, p. 87.
  66. ^ Sears 1983, p. 263.
  67. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 120.
  68. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 264–65.
  69. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 266–67.
  70. ^ Bailey 1984, pp. 125–26.
  71. ^ Sears 1983, p. 276.
  72. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 131.
  73. ^ Bailey 1984, pp. 132–36.
  74. ^ Bailey 1984, pp. 136–37.
  75. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 291–92.
  76. ^ 76.0 76.1 Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 105–108.
  77. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 297, 306–07.
  78. ^ 10,291 Confederate casualties: 1,567 killed and 8,724 wounded for the entire Maryland Campaign. See: Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Part 1, pp. 810–13.
  79. ^ https://www.nps.gov/anti/learn/historyculture/casualties.htm
  80. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 194, 206, 254, 287, 290.
  81. ^ "Death Tolls for Battles of the 16th, 17th, 18th & 19th Centuries (1500–1900)", citing the National Park Service.
  82. ^ Sears 1983, p. 296.
  83. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 67.
  84. ^ Sears 1983, pp. 338-339.
  85. ^ McPherson 2002, p. 155.
  86. ^ Sears 1983, p. 318.
  87. ^ Preservationists see victory at Antietam 150 years later. latimes. [August 10, 2015]. 
  88. ^ [1] American Battlefield Trust "Saved Land" webpage. Accessed May 22, 2018.
  89. ^ "Critical Piece of Antietam Battlefield Preserved," Hagerstown (Md.) Herald Mail, Sept. 30, 2015. Accessed Jan. 3, 2018.
  90. ^ Antietam Rebirth Accessed Jan. 3, 2018.
  91. ^ Brady employed almost two dozen men, each of whom was given a traveling darkroom, to photograph scenes from the battle. There are hundreds of photos in the National Archives taken by Brady and his associates from numerous Civil War sites.
  92. ^ Matthew [sic] Brady Antietam Photography Exhibit From 1862 Recreated At National Museum of Civil War Medicine. Huffington Post. October 5, 2012 [June 1, 2013]. (原始内容存档于October 21, 2012).  已忽略未知参数|url-status= (帮助); 已忽略未知参数|df= (帮助)
  93. ^ Brady's Photographs: Pictures of the Dead at Antietam. The New York Times. October 20, 1862. 
  94. ^ Hope paintings, Hope restored. National Park Service. 
  95. ^ James Hope (1818/19–1892) Papers, 1854–1983 (bulk: 1856–1872) MSA 529 & Size D (PDF). Vermont Historical Society. 
  96. ^ Bailey 1984, p. 110.
  97. ^ Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 168–70.
  98. ^ Site identified by Robert Kalasky, "Military Images" Volume XX, Number 6 May–June 1999, pp. 24–29.
  99. ^ The Union soldiers looking on were likely members of the 130th Pennsylvania, who were assigned burial detail
  100. ^ Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 144–47.
  101. ^ Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 171–74.
  102. ^ Original description claimed "Battlefield of Antietam on the Day of the Battle" September 17, 1862; however, see Frassanito, pp. 70–73.
  103. ^ America’s Civil War: 54th Massachusetts Regiment. Historynet.com. June 12, 2006 [March 11, 2017]. 
  104. ^ Klein, Christopher. "Glory" Regiment Attacks Fort Wagner, 150 Years Ago. The History Channel. July 18, 2013 [March 11, 2017]. 
  105. ^ http://noodlersink.com/noodlers-ink-color/ink-colors-and-their-properties/

來源[编辑]

第二手來源[编辑]

  • Armstrong, Marion V. Disaster in the West Woods: General Edwin V. Sumner and the II Corps at Antietam. Sharpsburg, MD: Western Maryland Interpretive Association. 2002. 
  • Bailey, Ronald H. The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books. 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4740-1. 
  • Cannan, John. The Antietam Campaign: August–September 1862. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1994. ISBN 0-938289-91-8.
  • Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. 
  • Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC 5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website.
  • Frassanito, William A. Antietam: The Photographic Legacy of America's Bloodiest Day. Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1978. ISBN 1-57747-005-2.
  • Harsh, Joseph L. Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-87338-641-8.
  • Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1999. ISBN 0-87338-631-0.
  • Jamieson, Perry D. Death in September: The Antietam Campaign. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 1999. ISBN 1-893114-07-4.
  • Kalasky, Robert. "Union dead...Confederate Dead'." Military Images Magazine. Volume XX, Number 6, May–June 1999.
  • Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6.
  • Luvaas, Jay, and Harold W. Nelson, eds. Guide to the Battle of Antietam. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987. ISBN 0-7006-0784-6.
  • McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press. 2002. ISBN 0-19-513521-0. 
  • Priest, John Michael. Antietam: The Soldiers' Battle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-19-508466-7.
  • Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X. 
  • Tucker, Phillip Thomas. Burnside's Bridge: The Climactic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. ISBN 0-8117-0199-9.
  • Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 1861–1865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1.
  • Wolff, Robert S. The Antietam Campaign. (编) Heidler, David S.; Heidler, Jeanne T. Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. 
  • National Park Service battle description

第一手來源[编辑]

延伸閱讀[编辑]

  • Armstrong Marion V., Jr. Unfurl Those Colors! McClellan, Sumner, and the Second Army Corps in the Antietam Campaign. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8173-1600-6.
  • Ballard, Ted. Battle of Antietam: Staff Ride Guide. Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2006. OCLC 68192262.
  • Breeden, James O. "Field Medicine at Antietam." Caduceus: A Humanities Journal for Medicine and the Health Sciences 10#1 (1994): 8–22.
  • Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. 1, South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2010. ISBN 978-1-932714-81-4.
  • Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Ezra A. Carman's Definitive Account of the Union and Confederate Armies at Antietam. Edited by Joseph Pierro. New York: Routledge, 2008. ISBN 0-415-95628-5.
  • Catton, Bruce. "Crisis at the Antietam." American Heritage 9#5 (August 1958): 54–96.
  • Frassanito, William A. Antietam: The Photographic Legacy of America's Bloodiest Day. New York: Scribner, 1978. ISBN 978-0-684-15659-0.
  • Frye, Dennis E. Antietam Shadows: Mystery, Myth & Machination. Sharpsburg, MD: Antietam Rest Publishing, 2018. ISBN 978-0-9854119-2-3.
  • Gallagher, Gary W., ed. Antietam: Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-87338-400-8.
  • Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of Antietam: An Atlas of the Antietam (Sharpsburg) Campaign, including the Battle of South Mountain, September 2–20, 1862. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2011. ISBN 978-1-61121-086-6.
  • Jermann, Donald R. Antietam: The Lost Order. Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Co., 2006. ISBN 1-58980-366-3.
  • Hartwig, D. Scott. To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Campaign of 1862. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. ISBN 978-1-4214-0631-2.
  • Murfin, James V. The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. ISBN 0-8071-0990-8.
  • Perry D. Jamieson and Bradford A. Wineman, The Maryland and Fredericksburg Campaigns, 1862–1863. Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2015. CMH Pub 75-6.
  • Rawley, James A. Turning Points of the Civil War. University of Nebraska Press. 1966. ISBN 0-8032-8935-9. OCLC 44957745. 
  • Reardon, Carol and Tom Vossler. A Field Guide to Antietam: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People (U of North Carolina Press, 2016) 347 pp.
  • Slotkin, Richard. The Long Road to Antietam: How the Civil War Became a Revolution. New York: Liveright, 2012. ISBN 978-0-87140-411-4.
  • Vermilya, Daniel J. That Field of Blood: The Battle of Antietam, September 17, 1862. Emerging Civil War Series. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2018. ISBN 978-1-61121-375-1.

外部連結[编辑]