旁路攻击
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在密码学中,旁道攻击(英语:Side-channel attack)是一种攻击方式,它基于从密码系统的物理实现中获取的信息而非暴力破解法或是算法中的理论性弱点(较之密码分析)。例如,时间信息、功率消耗、电磁泄露或甚是声音可以提供额外的信息来源,这可被利用于进一步对系统的破解。某些侧信道攻击还要求攻击者有关于密码系统内部操作的技术性信息,不过,其他诸如差分电力分析的方法在黑盒攻击中效果明显。许多卓有成效的测信道攻击基于由Paul Kocher开拓的统计学方法。[1]
需要注意的是,如果破解密码学系统使用的信息是通过与其使用人的合法交流获取的,这通常不被认为是旁路攻击,而是社会工程学攻击。
参见[编辑]
参考资料[编辑]
- ^ Kocher, Paul. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO’96. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 1996, 1109: 104–113 [14 April 2014]. doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9.
延伸阅读[编辑]
- 书籍
- Ambrose, Jude 等. Power Analysis Side Channel Attacks: The Processor Design-level Context. VDM Verlag. 2010. ISBN 9783836485081.
- 文章
- [1], Differential Power Analysis, P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, B. Jun, appeared in CRYPTO'99.
- [2], Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems, P. Kocher.
- [3], Introduction to Differential Power Analysis and Related attacks, 1998, P Kocher, J Jaffe, B Jun.
- Nist.gov, a cautionary Note Regarding Evaluation of AES Candidates on Smart Cards, 1999, S Chari, C Jutla, J R Rao, P Rohatgi
- DES and Differential Power Analysis, L Goubin and J Patarin, in Proceedings of CHES'99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Nr 1717, Springer-Verlag
- Grabher, Philipp 等. Cryptographic Side-Channels from Low-power Cache Memory. (编) Galbraith, Steven D. Cryptography and coding: 11th IMA International Conference, Cirencester, UK, December 18-20, 2007 : proceedings, Volume 11. Springer. 2007. ISBN 9783540772712.
- Kamal, Abdel Alim; Youssef, Amr M. Fault analysis of the NTRUSign digital signature scheme. Cryptography and Communications. 2012, 4 (2): 131–144. doi:10.1007/s12095-011-0061-3.
- Daniel Genkin; Adi Shamir; Eran Tromer. RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis. Tel Aviv University. December 18, 2013 [October 15, 2014].
外部链接[编辑]
- New side channel attack techniques
- COSADE Workshop International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
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