旁路攻擊
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在密碼學中,旁道攻擊(英語:Side-channel attack)是一種攻擊方式,它基於從密碼系統的物理實現中獲取的信息而非暴力破解法或是算法中的理論性弱點(較之密碼分析)。例如,時間信息、功率消耗、電磁泄露或甚是聲音可以提供額外的信息來源,這可被利用於進一步對系統的破解。某些側信道攻擊還要求攻擊者有關於密碼系統內部操作的技術性信息,不過,其他諸如差分電力分析的方法在黑盒攻擊中效果明顯。許多卓有成效的測信道攻擊基於由Paul Kocher開拓的統計學方法。[1]
需要注意的是,如果破解密碼學系統使用的信息是通過與其使用人的合法交流獲取的,這通常不被認為是旁路攻擊,而是社會工程學攻擊。
參見[編輯]
參考資料[編輯]
- ^ Kocher, Paul. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO』96. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 1996, 1109: 104–113 [14 April 2014]. doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9.
延伸閲讀[編輯]
- 書籍
- Ambrose, Jude 等. Power Analysis Side Channel Attacks: The Processor Design-level Context. VDM Verlag. 2010. ISBN 9783836485081.
- 文章
- [1], Differential Power Analysis, P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, B. Jun, appeared in CRYPTO'99.
- [2], Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems, P. Kocher.
- [3], Introduction to Differential Power Analysis and Related attacks, 1998, P Kocher, J Jaffe, B Jun.
- Nist.gov, a cautionary Note Regarding Evaluation of AES Candidates on Smart Cards, 1999, S Chari, C Jutla, J R Rao, P Rohatgi
- DES and Differential Power Analysis, L Goubin and J Patarin, in Proceedings of CHES'99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Nr 1717, Springer-Verlag
- Grabher, Philipp 等. Cryptographic Side-Channels from Low-power Cache Memory. (編) Galbraith, Steven D. Cryptography and coding: 11th IMA International Conference, Cirencester, UK, December 18-20, 2007 : proceedings, Volume 11. Springer. 2007. ISBN 9783540772712.
- Kamal, Abdel Alim; Youssef, Amr M. Fault analysis of the NTRUSign digital signature scheme. Cryptography and Communications. 2012, 4 (2): 131–144. doi:10.1007/s12095-011-0061-3.
- Daniel Genkin; Adi Shamir; Eran Tromer. RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis. Tel Aviv University. December 18, 2013 [October 15, 2014].
外部連結[編輯]
- New side channel attack techniques
- COSADE Workshop International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
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