1947年3月30日，紐約時報報導：「所有見證了當地人民被中國軍隊與警察屠殺、洗劫、大批囚禁的外國人士都表示有一股強烈的敵意在福爾摩沙人民中蔓延……中國對該島嶼的取得尚未透過國際條約正式化，這在對日和約締結之前都無法發生，福爾摩沙人知道這一點，有些人在談論向聯合國請願將該島列入國際託管（英語：mandate (international law)），他們強調中國對福爾摩沙的歷史主張比不上更早之前就已在此從事貿易活動的日本人、荷蘭人、葡萄牙人。」
1950年6月25日，韓戰爆發，為了堅守西太平洋的反共防線，美國政府一改先前的消極態度—杜魯門於兩天後發表「韓戰聲明」(Korean War Statement)，除了宣布台灣海峽中立化，派遣第七艦隊協防台海外。美國總統杜魯門同時表示：「福爾摩沙（臺灣）若遭共產勢力占領，將會對太平洋區域及美國於此區之維和勢力造成直接威脅……台灣未來的地位，必須等待太平洋地區的安全恢復，以及對日本的和平條約成立，或經過聯合國討論後，再作決定。」此即為台灣地位未定論的起源。部分原文：Truman's Korean War Statement (June 27, 1950)
In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.
與此同時，對日本就二戰善後問題的議和工作，也持續進行中。作為戰勝國之一的中國，卻出現兩個政府各自宣稱擁有合法代表權。在冷戰態勢下，國際上對於代表權承認的態度呈現分歧，應由哪一方代表中國簽訂和約，受到極大關注。當時蘇聯力挺由中華人民共和國出席，美國則極力爭取由中華民國政府出席。由於無法達成共識，為避免因僵持而拖延和約簽訂，最後決定「兩個中國」都不邀請。1951年9月8日，《舊金山對日和平條約》（簡稱《舊金山和約》）由代表盟軍的48個國家與日本簽訂，正式結束戰爭狀態。當中第二條b項規定：「日本放棄對台灣及澎湖群島的一切權利、權利根據及要求。」（Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.），並未明確表示台灣主權的移轉對象，也未訂有如同第二十一條的「朝鮮條款」直接允許獨立。不過，如果將第二條c項日本對千島群島、庫頁島(南樺太)以及鄰近各島嶼所做相同的放棄聲明（Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905）拿來做比較，也同樣未指明這些島嶼的前途。蘇聯獲得根據1905年的《朴次茅斯和約》俄國轉讓給日本的庫頁島（南樺太）等島嶼之領土。但因《日蘇共同宣言》未明確界定，日俄兩國間關於「北方四島」及「南千島群島」的爭議至今仍未獲得解決，雙方仍不時起爭端，可見在法理上並不因俄國的佔領與管轄就能自動取得土地的權利。
當時負責《中日和約》簽訂的外交部長葉公超於1952年在立法院接受立委質詢時說明：「在現行情況下，日本沒有權利把台灣和澎湖群島轉移給我們，即使日本有意如此，我們也不能接受。」（資料來源：Despatch No.31 from the American Embassy in Taipei to the Department of State, July 23, 1952, Enclosure 2, at p.2.）（美國專家譚慎格在「重估『一個中國』政策」一書引用1952年7月23日美國大使館給國務院的資料）
There are also reasons why we should not seek to change the status quo: any United States action supporting Japan’s claim to the Kuriles might appear to reflect on our position under the San Francisco Treaty in the Ryukyus and might affect the status of Formosa, which Japan also renounced under the treaty;
The United States cannot consistently take the position that Japan has not renounced the Kuriles, any more than she could take the position that she had not renounced Formosa and the Pescadores. She must, in view of the position taken by the Secretary and by the United States Senate, contend that their disposition is for future international action. It would be perfectly consistent for the United States to support Japan in the argument that these islands, or part of them, should be returned to Japan by international action, such as an accord among the Allied Powers, including the Soviet Union.
2008年6月12日，許慶雄說，如果認為台灣可以在國際社會都不知道的情況下偷偷宣布獨立建國，那就違背國際法法理，因為國家不可能在神不知鬼不覺之中完成獨立建國；「台灣已經成為獨立國家，但全世界都不知道，只有台灣人民自己知道」，這是不可能的；「國家必須具備領域、人民、政府等要素；但像中華民國台灣這樣支配某些地域、人民且有政府的組織型態，卻不一定是國家。即使具備成為國家的要素，如果沒有『意志』建國、積極主動持續向國際社會『宣布獨立』（Declaration of Independence）以表明建國的決心，就不可能成為主權國家。」
由臺灣旅美學者陳隆志與其師拉斯威爾（Harold Lasswell）教授合著的「Formosa, China and the United Nations」一書（1967年出版），對臺灣的國際法律地位有詳細的討論。後來也與另一位同事Michael Reisman博士合著「Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title」一文，在1972年3月份的耶魯法學期刊（The Yale Law Journal）發表。這些都認為當時台灣的國際法律地位未定。至於決定的方式則是要依據住民自決的原則，由台灣的住民依據自己的意願，來決定自己的前途。
In article 2 of the Japanese Peace Treaty, which entered into force April 28, 1952, Japan renounced all 'right, title and claim' to Formosa. Neither this agreement nor any other agreement thereafter has purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to China.
Formosa may be said to be a territory or an area occupied and administered by the Government of the Republic of China, but is not officially recognized as being a part of the Republic of China.
America and China's tumultuous relationship over the past sixty years has trapped the inhabitants of Taiwan in political purgatory. During this time the people on Taiwan have lived without any uniformly recognized government. In practical terms, this means they have uncertain status in the world community which infects the population's day-to-day lives.
美國與中國過去60年間爭吵不休之關係，讓台灣住民（the inhabitants of Taiwan）陷入政治煉獄中。在此期間，台灣人民（the people on Taiwan）生活在無普遍承認的政府統治之下。以實務角度言之，他們在國際社會中並無確定的地位（uncertain status），已影響到這些人的日常生活。
President Carter recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the government of China, and derecognized the Republic of China, located on Taiwan. See S. Kan, Cong. Research Serv., China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 「 One China」 Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei 1, 10 (Oct. 10, 2014). As to the status of Taiwan, the President「acknowledge[d] the Chinese position」 that 「Taiwan is part of China,」 id., at 39(text of U. S.–PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
(Jan. 1, 1979)), but he did not accept that claim.
總統承認PRC是中國政府,且撤銷對位置在台灣的ROC的承認,見(S. Kan, Cong. Research Serv., China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 「One China」 Pol (Oct. 10, 2014).) 對於台灣的狀態,總統用"承認(或認知)[d]中國的立場"為"台灣是中國的一部分,", id., at 39(text of U. S.–PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations(Jan. 1, 1979)),但他沒有接受這個主張.
1.(f.) The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrenders and all surrenders of Japanese Forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.
^Warren R. Austin to Trygve Lie, August 25, 1950，第3頁第4點，1950年8月25日，美國總統杜魯門就台灣問題給美國駐聯合國代表奧斯汀的信，美國杜魯門圖書館與博物館網站，（英文）."The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Vol. VIII, The Far East. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1971: pp. 358–359（英文）. "In particular, it is considered that exemption from Japanese jurisdiction was not intended to be accorded the estimated 20,000 persons in Japan claiming to be Taiwanese; these persons throughout the war were enemy nationals and according to Japanese law still retain Japanese nationality, excepting only those who have individually divested themselves thereof in accordance with established procedure......It should, however, be pointed out that from the legal standpoint the transfer of Taiwan's Sovereignty remains to be formalized; assumably a treaty of cession will in due course be negotiated which will effect such transfer and which may contain provisions in regard to appropriate change in the national status of Taiwan's residents."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. Vol. VII, The Far East: China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1972: p. 433（英文）. "Formosans stress American responsibility through Cairo decision and have published intent to appeal for American help in seeking UN intervention pending final transfer sovereignty to China. Responsible island-wide group preparing formal petition and has so advised Consulate. One such petition received addressed to General Marshall. Possibilities of interim administration under SCAP openly discussed. ......American prestige high and intervention profoundly desired by Formosans who believe representations at Nanking and direct intervention here justifiable for UN under present Japanese de jure sovereignty status."
^Tillman Durdin. Formosa Killings Are Put at 10,000. New York Times (New York). March 29, 1947 [January 25, 2015]. （原始內容存檔於March 8, 2015）. （需要訂閱（說明））（英文）. "Formosans are reported to be seeking United Nations' action on their case. Some have approached foreign consuls to ask that Formosa be put under the jurisdiction of Allied Supreme Command or be made an American protectorate. Formosan hostility to the mainland Chinese has deepened.
Two women who described events at Pingtung said that when Formosans assembled to take over the administration of the town they sang "The Star Spangled Banner.""
^Tillman Durdin. Formosans' Plea for Red Aid Seen. New York Times (New York). March 30, 1947 [March 6, 2015]. （原始內容存檔於March 8, 2015）. （需要訂閱（說明））（英文）. "All foreign witnesses of the slaughters, looting and wholesale imprisonment of natives by Chinese troops and police agree that bitter hostility has been fanned among Formosans......China's possession of the island has not been formalized by international treaty. This cannot come about until the peace pact with Japan is concluded. Formosans know this and some are talking of appealing to the United Nations to put the island under an international mandate. They stress that China has no more historical claim to Formosa than the Japanese, Dutch and Portuguese, who had early trading interests there."
^HC Deb 30 June 1947 vol 439 c938（英文）. "It is the view of His Majesty's Government that formal transfer of territories formerly owned or annexed by Japan must await the eventual Peace Conference with Japan."
^CIA. Probable Developments in Taiwan (PDF). pp. 1–4. March 14, 1949 [March 8, 2015]. （原始內容存檔於February 15, 2015） （英文）. "From the legal standpoint, Taiwan is not part of the Republic of China. Pending a Japanese peace treaty, the island remains occupied territory......neither the US, or any other power, has formally recognized the annexation by China of Taiwan......There is a strong sentiment in Taiwan favoring autonomy, but the situation is complicated by the conflicting interests of the native Taiwanese and Chinese Nationalist element. The Taiwanese bitterly resent the performance of the Nationalist administration on Taiwan since VJ-day. The Chinese rulers have exploited the native population to the limit, without regard for their welfare or the preservation of the island's resources......The Nationalist Army, Navy and Air Force are not only inefficient, but their loyalty and will to fight are questionable. In addition, such a refugee regime would be unstable because of the hostility of the local population which, in these circumstances, would be increasingly susceptible to Communist influence."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. Vol. IX, The Far East: China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1974: p. 342（英文）. "......should a refugee Chinese government or a Chinese government in exile be set up in Taiwan, which is not yet legally Chinese territory, it is probable that the British Government would simply appoint a British Consulate in Tamsui as an office of the British Embassy in China......any Chinese government established in Taiwan would be in a very ambiguous position and would present difficult problems to the governments of the world and especially to the United Nations."
^HC Deb 14 November 1949 vol 469 c1679（英文）. "Any change in the legal status of Formosa can only be formally effected in a treaty of peace with Japan."
^Memorandum by Voorhees to Johnson, 14 December 1949, Formosa file, RG 6, box 8, MacArthur Memorial, NARA（英文） "Formosa remains legally a part of Japan until a treaty of peace. At Potsdam, it was agreed that Japanese areas other than the four main islands should be assigned respectively to certain of the Allies for control until a treaty could be made. Under this plan Formosa was assigned to China......until there is a treaty of peace the Nationalist Government of China is merely a custodian......"
^TNA: CAB 129/41/6, Formosa, 03 July 1950, p. 2 （英文） "In 1943 Formosa was part of the territory of the Japanese Empire and His Majesty's Government consider that Formosa is still de jure part of that territory......On 25th October, 1945, as a result of an Order issued on the basis of consultation and agreement between the Allied Powers concerned, the Japanese Forces in Formosa surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek. Thereupon, with the consent of the Allied Powers, administration of Formosa was undertaken by the Government of the Republic of China."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VII, Korea. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1976: p. 383（英文）. "Even though declarations in regard to the intention of the US and UK toward the return of Formosa to China had been made at Cairo and even though these declarations of intentions had been confirmed by the Potsdam pronouncements with which the USSR was associated, the fact was that the title to Formosa had not passed to China. I myself seriously doubted the legal authority of two or three powers to convey title for Formosa to China and that actually China could not be vested with the title to Formosa except by the terms of an international agreement or peace settlement with Japan or alternatively in accordance with and pursuant to a lawfully made decision of the UN."
^HC Deb 26 July 1950 vol 478 c60W（英文）. "His Majesty's Government have recognised de jure the Chinese Central People's Government as the legitimate Government of China, and as such entitled to enjoy the rights of the Chinese State.
Formosa is still de jure Japanese territory and there is no Government of Formosa as such. Following on the surrender of Japan, the Chinese Government of the day assumed, with the consent of the remaining Allies, the provisional administration of the territory pending the final determination of its status at a peace settlement......because of the provisional nature of the present administration of Formosa, it is the hope of His Majesty's Government that the disposal of Formosa will be decided, as has always been contemplated, in connection with the peace settlement, with Japan."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1976: p. 398（英文）. "There come to mind number of factors, generally unenvisaged at time Cairo Declaration, which lead us not to accept that Declaration as necessarily last word on subj Formosa.
(a) Commitments by USSR in connection with Cairo and Potsdam (e.g. independence of Korea and support of Natl Govt of Chi) have been grossly flouted;
(b) Record of Chi Natl Govt in Formosa, which assumed responsibility fol VJ-Day, has not been satis;
(c) It appears to us to be one thing to turn Formosa over to Rep of Chi as constituted at time Cairo Declaration; quite another to turn it over to Peiping regime which is acting in support of Moscow conspiracy against free nations;
(d) In view drastic change in situation in Chi and hostile totalitarian regime now established Peiping, are democratic countries not entitled to question the turning of Formosa over to such regime without consulting Formosans or applying principles of UN Charter applicable to dependent peoples?......"
^Letter Dated 50/08/25 from the Representative of the United States of America to the Secretary-General Concerning Formosa (PDF). United Nations. p. 4. August 25, 1950 [February 18, 2015]（英文）. "The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the Island. The actual status of the Island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."
^Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXIII: 1950. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1950: pp. 607–608 （英文）. "Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act......The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, and that the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special position or privilege with respect to Formosa. The United States believes further that the future of Formosa and of the nearly 8 million people inhabited there should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1976: p. 588（英文）. "On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends."
^Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXIV: 1951. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1951: p. 65 （英文）. "That Declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be considered. The United States cannot accept the view, apparently put forward by the Soviet Government, that the views of other Allies not represented at Cairo must be wholly ignored. Also, the United States believes that declarations such as that issued at Cairo must necessarily be considered in the light of the United Nations Charter, the obligations of which prevail over any other international agreement."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1977: pp. 886–887（英文）. "Mr. Spender's second point was with regard to Formosa. He said that if the intention was to confirm the National Government's title to the island Australia would have serious reservations. The Australian Government has no desire to recognize the Chinese Communist regime but is very unhappy over continued recognition of the National Government, and would be reluctant to strengthen that Government by giving it Formosa. Ambassador Dulles said that Formosa presented a difficult problem. It was not our intention to confirm the National Government's title to Formosa. Mr. Spender suggested that the best solution might be to require Japan to renounce title without indicating to whom title had been transferred."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1977: pp. 953, 954（英文）. "It is the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the Central People's Government of China should be invited to participate in any negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan......With respect to the second point, that is the renunciation by Japan of claims to Formosa in favor of China without specifying what China. Sir Oliver said that he thought our language, which provided for the renunciation of Formosa by Japan, but without specifying who should have it was a little bit vague......Ambassador Dulles said that this, too, presented us with many problems but that we would consider the British views carefully."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1977: pp. 977, 978（英文）. "As the Government of the United States does not recognize the Central People's Government of China it would not find it possible to invite that regime to participate in negotiations with it for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan......With respect to Formosa, Mr. Dulles emphasized the view of the United States that a Treaty with Japan should do nothing which would of itself and suddenly eliminate all international concern over the disposition of Formosa; nor did it appear wise to the United States Government that Japan by a Treaty should be compelled to take action which might in fact result in Japan itself becoming embroiled in a controversy or being given an opportunity to claim that the “China” to which Formosa had been turned over was not the “China” to which the Japanese had intended, by the Treaty, Formosa should be turned over. Mr. Dulles then reviewed at some length the United States general position with regard to Formosa and the undesirability of turning over to a Communist regime the island and people of Formosa without some attempt being made to determine the desires of the people of that island......"
^Transcript of Second Day of MacArthur's Testimony. New York Times (New York). May 5, 1951 [January 28, 2015]. （原始內容存檔於March 8, 2015）. （需要訂閱（說明））（英文）. "It has not, sir. Legalistically it is still a part of defeated Japan. The disposition of the various segments of the Empire of Japan has not yet been formally determined. There were certain agreements that were entered into, as I understood it, at Yalta and other places, but legalistically Formosa is still a part of the Empire of Japan."
^Department of State. Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1951: p. 93. "The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands. The future of Formosa was referred to in the Cairo Declaration but that Declaration also contained provisions in respect to Korea, together with the basic principles of non-aggression and no territorial ambitions. Until China shows by her action that she accepts those provisions and principles, it will be difficult to reach a final settlement of the problem of Formosa. In due course a solution must be found, in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In the meantime, however, it would be wrong to postpone making peace with Japan. We therefore came to the conclusion that the proper treatment of Formosa in the context of the Japanese peace treaty was for the treaty to provide only for renunciation of Japanese sovereignty."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954. Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1985: p. 770（英文）. "......Formosa and the Pescadores had a distinctive juridical status under the Japanese Peace Treaty. They were not technically under Chinese sovereignty since Japan had made no cession in favor of China......once we mad a security treaty with Nationalist China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, it would be necessary for them to refrain from offensive operations from their “privileged sanctuary”."
^Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXXI: 1954. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1954: p. 896 （英文）. "The legal position is different, as I think I pointed out in my last press conference, by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese peace treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these island. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese peace treaty, nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore, the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory."
^HC Deb 20 December 1954 vol 535 c2431（英文）. "The position with regard to Formosa is that Japan has renounced her sovereignty over it, but in our view it has not become part of China."
^Department of External Affairs. Current Notes on International Affairs. Vol. 26. Canberra: Department of External Affairs. 1955: p. 57 （英文）. "In this area of tension and danger a distinction, I think, can validly be made between the position of Formosa and Pescadores, and the islands off the China coast now in Nationalist hands; the latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had had a checkered history before that are not...... Negotiations for a cease fire need not involve any question of the final disposition of the territory in dispute."
^HC Deb 01 February 1955 vol 536 c901（英文）. "It contained merely a statement of common purpose......The question of future sovereignty over Formosa was left undetermined by the Japanese Peace Treaty."
^HC Deb 04 February 1955 vol 536 c159W（英文）. "......This Declaration was a statement of intention that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. This retrocession has, in fact, never taken place, because of the difficulties arising from the existence of two entities claiming to represent China, and the differences amongst the Powers as to the status of these entities.
......In September, 1945, the administration of Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers; but this was not a cession, nor did it in itself involve any change of sovereignty. The arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and did not of themselves constitute the territory Chinese.
Under the Peace Treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined."
^James Reston. New Formosa Bid. New York Times (New York). February 6, 1955 [March 12, 2015]. （原始內容存檔於March 8, 2015）. （需要訂閱（說明））（英文）. "......Secretary of State Dulles prepared to go before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow to urge Senate ratification of the mutual assistance treaty with the Republic of China.
The Administration clarified its position on the legal status of Formosa, and was prepared to make clear to the Senate that ratification of the treaty with President Chiang Kai-shek would not give him legal sovereignty over Formosa and Pescadores......
......Some prominent Democrats have suggested that the signing of a mutual defense agreement with President Chiang will change the legal status of these territories and give the Nationalists sovereignty over them.
Mr. Dulles will reject this argument when he testifies on the treaty this week. He will assert that the Administration does not regard the sovereignty of Formosa and the Pescadores as having been settled. His view is that the treaty will not give General Chiang sovereignty over these islands.
Ths position of the Administration is that these territories were handed over to the Allied and associated powers of World War II by Japan, which had held them since 1895, and that General Chiang was merely asked to administer them for the Allied and associated powers pending a final decision as to their ownership......"
^Executive Sessions Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). Vol. VII, Eighty-Four Congress, First Session, 1955. Washington: United States Government Publishing Office. 1978: pp. 316, 318, 325, 330 （英文）. "It speaks of territories of the parties but it uses that term not as indicating necessarily sovereignty any more than the United States has the sovereignty, for example, over the Ryukyus, which are also a subject of this treaty......the United States has not the power alone by this treaty to convey title, because title is not in the United States. Nor does it purport to do so. Therefore in my opinion the status of the Republic of China in relation to Formosa is for all practical purpose unchanged and unaltered by this treaty......Chiang theoretically I suppose has a government in exile still sitting in an alien land of Formosa......The words used here are carefully chosen words when we speak about the “territories of” which indicate that we do not intend necessarily to imply sovereignty. Of course we do not have sovereignty over the Ryukyus, which are also covered......We are dealing at the moment with an occupying power, an occupant, just as we are an occupant in the Ryukyus......"
^HC Deb 04 May 1955 vol 540 c1867（英文）. "It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."
^HC Deb 09 February 1955 vol 536 c216w（英文）. "I have been unable to trace any such proclamation. Unilateral declarations could not affect the legal status of Formosa......"
^HC Deb 04 May 1955 vol 540 cc1870–1（英文）. "The document in question was the Cairo Declaration. That was couched in the form of a statement of intention, and as it was merely a statement of intention, it is merely binding in so far as it states the intent at that time, and therefore it cannot by itself transfer sovereignty......The case of Formosa is different. The sovereignty was Japanese until 1952. The Japanese Treaty came into force, and at that time Formosa was being administered by the Chinese Nationalists, to whom it was entrusted in 1945, as a military occupation......That position has been made quite clear by the statement the Prime Minister made in the House on 4th February, which has been quoted by the hon. and learned Member. Therefore I shall not repeat it. In reply—I quote the concluding passages of his statement—he said: "Formosa and the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined." ......the fact is that Formosa is not under Chinese sovereignty. That does not mean that the Chinese Nationalists have no right to be there. Their presence springs from their military occupancy in which they were placed by the Allied Powers in 1945, pending future arrangements."
^Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957. Vol. II, China. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1986: p. 619（英文）. "......Even the juridical position of Taiwan is in doubt. The United States also has an interest in Taiwan which we got away from Japan. Japan has merely renounced sovereignty over Taiwan which has not been disposed of by the peace treaty and not ceded to anyone. Consequently the United States could assert a legal claim until Taiwan is disposed of by some means. We cannot, therefore, admit that the disposition of Taiwan is merely an internal problem."
^HC Deb 19 November 1958 vol 595 c1140–1（英文）. "......the Cairo Declaration, which was reaffirmed by the Potsdam Declaration, was merely a statement of common purpose. Both were made at a time when there was only one entity claiming to represent China. Since then there has been a civil war in China and opinions differ as to who now represents the Government of China. The problem of Formosa has become an international one, in which a number of nations are concerned, and it cannot be solved merely by reference to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations."
^参議院会議録情報 第038回国会 予算委員会 第15号. 昭和36年3月15日. p. 19.（日文）. "ポツダム宣言には、カイロ宣言の条項は履行せらるべしということが書いてある。そうしてわれわれは降伏文書によって、ポツダム宣言の受諾を宣言したのであります。しかし、これは降伏文書というものは、休戦協定の性格を有するものでありまして、領土的処理を行ない得ない性質のものであるということを申し上げたのであります。"
^HC Deb 23 June 1966 vol 730 c130W（英文）. "Her Majesty's Government believe that the China seat in the United Nations should be occupied by representatives of the Chinese People's Republic. As for Formosa, it is our view that sovereignty over this island is undetermined."
^HC Deb 19 December 1966 vol 738 cc185–6W（英文）. "Our position on the status of Formosa was outlined on 28th November by my noble Friend Lord Caradon in his explanation of our vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of Chinese representation in that organisation. A copy186W of his statement is in the Library. It remains our view that sovereignty over the island of Formosa is undetermined."
^衆議院会議録情報 第087回国会 予算委員会 第12号. 昭和54年2月16日. p. 47.（日文）. "台湾及び澎湖島に対するわが国のあらゆる権原はサンフランシスコ平和条約によって放棄せられたわけでございます。その場合に、それがだれのために放棄せられたかということがサンフラシスコ平和条約では決め得なかった。したがって、その台湾及び澎湖島の帰属先が法律的に未定であった、サンフランシスコの平和条約では未定であったというところからその問題が発生するわけで、いわゆる台湾の地位がどうなのだという問題かその後ずっとあったわけでございます。"
^衆議院会議録情報 第162回国会 外務委員会 第7号. 平成17年5月13日. p. 18.（日文）. "日本はサンフランシスコ平和条約によって台湾を放棄いたしました……日華平和条約においては同放棄が承認をされた。ただ、その場合、どこの国に対して放棄したかは明記していないわけでございます。したがって、台湾がどこに帰属するかについて、これは専ら連合国が決定すべき問題であり、日本は発言する立場にない、これが日本側の一貫した法的な立場であります。"
^Emma Chanlett-Avery; Derry Dumbaugh; William H. Cooper. Sino-Japanese Relations: Issues for U.S. Policy. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. p. 6. December 19, 2008 [March 8, 2015]. （原始內容存檔於December 28, 2014） （英文）. "......after Japan's defeat in 1945, Taiwan and the Pescadores were assigned to the Republic of China for purposes of post-war occupation. Taiwan was still under this occupation four years later, when the ROC government fled to Taiwan after the communist victory in the civil war on mainland China."
^Chen Lung-chu, W. M. Reisman. Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title. Yale Law Journal. March 1972,. Vol. 81 (4): pp. 611–612 （英文）. "At the conclusion of World War II, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Command in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, authorized the Nationalist Chinese authorities to accept the surrender of Formosa from the Japanese and to undertake temporarily military occupation of the island as a trustee on behalf of the Allied Powers. Chinese occupation proved unfortunate; maladministration, corruption, atrocities, and deprivations of human rights ensued."
^Jonathan I Charney, J. R. V. Prescott. Resolving Cross-Strait Relations Between China and Taiwan. American Journal of International Law. July 2000,. Vol. 94 (3). doi:10.2307/2555319. JSTOR2555319（英文）. "After occupying Taiwan in 1945 as a result of Japan's surrender, the Nationalists were defeated on the mainland in 1949, abandoning it to retreat to Taiwan."
^Y. Frank Chiang. One-China Policy and Taiwan. Fordham International Law Journal. December 2004,. Vol. 28 (1): p. 27, p. 80 （英文）. "In August 1945, when U.S. General MacArthur (as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) assigned the R.O.C government to receive the surrender of the Japanese commanders in Taiwan, the R.O.C. government was still in control of a large part of China's territory. But, by 1949, that government had lost control over most of China's territory to the Chinese Communists in a civil war and taken refuge in Formosa, outside of China's territory.....It was the United States that assigned Chiang Kai-shek's R.O.C. government to occupy and administer the island of Taiwan on its behalf. So, fifty years later, the R.O.C. government still acts as an agent of the United States. The passage of time will not change, and has not changed, the legal relationship of agent and principal."
^Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mandate for Change, 1953-1956. Garden City, New York: Doubleday. March 1963: p. 461 （英文）. "The Japanese peace treaty of 1951 ended Japanese sovereignty over the islands but did not formally cede them to "China," either Communist or Nationalist."
^New Jersey v. New York, 523 US 767 (1998). US Supreme Court. 26 May 1998 [29 January 2010]. "Even as to terra nullius, like a volcanic island or territory abandoned by its former sovereign, a claimant by right as against all others has more to do than planting a flag or rearing a monument. Since the 19th century the most generous settled view has been that discovery accompanied by symbolic acts give no more than "an inchoate title, an option, as against other states, to consolidate the first steps by proceeding to effective occupation within a reasonable time.8 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 146 (4th ed.1990); see also 1 C. Hyde, International Law 329 (rev.2d ed.1945); 1 L. Oppenheim International Law §§222-223, pp. 439-441 (H. Lauterpacht 5th ed.1937); Hall A Treatise on International Law, at 102-103; 1 J. Moore, International Law 258 (1906); R. Phillimore, International Law 273 (2d ed. 1871); E. Vattel, Law of Nations, §208, p. 99 (J. Chitty 6th Am. ed. 1844)."
^Henckaerts, Jean-Marie. The international status of Taiwan in the new world order: legal and political considerations. Kluwer Law International. 1996: 337. ISBN90-41-10929-3. "p7. "In any case, there appears to be strong legal ground to support the view that since the entry into force of the 1952 ROC-Japan bilateral peace treaty, Taiwan has become the de jure territory of the ROC. This interpretation of the legal status of Taiwan is confirmed by several Japanese court decisions. For instance, in the case of Japan v. Lai Chin Jung, decided by the Tokyo High Court on December 24, 1956, it was stated that ‘Formosa and the Pescadores came to belong to the Republic of China, at any rate on August 5, 1952, when the [Peace] Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China came into force…’”
p8. “the principles of prescription and occupation that may justify the ROC's claim to Taiwan certainly are not applicable to the PRC because the application of these two principles to the Taiwan situation presupposes the validity of the two peace treaties by which Japan renounce its claim to Taiwan and thus makes the island terra nullius.""