User:Tfdyrtswa3w4se5dr/南方政策

维基百科，自由的百科全书
美国人口调查局定义的美国南部

在美国政治里，南方策略是指美国共和党靠诉诸于针对非洲裔美国人的种族主义来赢得政治支持和助选的政治策略。[1][2][3][4][5]

民主党由于在南北内战之前支持奴隶制、战后支持种族隔离政策长达一个世纪，在南方一直受到选民的广泛支持。这种局面在民主党在 1948 年总统选举上转向支持民权运动之后开始改变。非洲裔美国人人权运动、民权法案和选举法案和反对种族隔离等政策都使民主党逐步疏远了南方选民。

南方策略的共和党人包括尼克松总统和参议员巴里·戈德华特。[6][7] in the late 1960s.[8] The strategy was successful in many regards. It contributed to the electoral realignment of Southern states to the Republican Party, but at the expense of losing more than 90 percent of black voters to the Democratic Party. As the twentieth century came to a close, the Republican Party began trying to appeal again to black voters, though with little success.[8]

Introduction[编辑]

Nixon campaigning in 1968

Although the phrase "Southern strategy" is often attributed to Nixon's political strategist Kevin Phillips, he did not originate it,[9] but merely popularized it.[10] In an interview included in a 1970 New York Times article, he touched on its essence:

From now on, the Republicans are never going to get more than 10 to 20 percent of the Negro vote and they don't need any more than that...but Republicans would be shortsighted if they weakened enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. The more Negroes who register as Democrats in the South, the sooner the Negrophobe whites will quit the Democrats and become Republicans. That's where the votes are. Without that prodding from the blacks, the whites will backslide into their old comfortable arrangement with the local Democrats.[2]

While Phillips sought to polarize ethnic voting in general, and not just to win the white South, the South was by far the biggest prize yielded by his approach. Its success began at the presidential level, gradually trickling down to statewide offices, the Senate, and the House, as some legacy segregationist Democrats retired or switched to the GOP. In addition, the Republican Party worked for years to develop grassroots political organizations across the South, supporting candidates for local school boards and offices, as one example. Following the Watergate scandal, there was broad support for the Southern Democrat Jimmy Carter in the 1976 election.

From 1948 to 1984 the Southern states, traditionally a stronghold for the Democrats, became key swing states, providing the popular vote margins in the 1960, 1968 and 1976 elections. During this era, several Republican candidates expressed support for states' rights, which some critics claim was a "codeword" of opposition to federal enforcement of civil rights for blacks and intervention on their behalf, including passage of legislation to protect the franchise.[4]

Political scientists Richard Johnston (University of Pennsylvania) and Byron Shafer (University of Wisconsin) have argued that this phenomenon had more to do with the economics than it had to do with race. In The End of Southern Exceptionalism, Johnston and Shafer wrote that the Republicans' gains in the South corresponded to the growth of the upper middle class in that region. They suggested that such individuals believed their economic interests were better served by the Republicans than the Democrats. According to Johnston and Shafer, working-class white voters in the South continued to vote for Democrats for national office until the 1990s. In summary, Shafer told The New York Times, "[whites] voted by their economic preferences, not racial preferences".[11]

In 1980, Republican candidate Ronald Reagan's proclaiming "I believe in states' rights" at his first Southern campaign stop was cited as evidence that the Republican Party was building upon the Southern strategy again.[5][12] Reagan launched his campaign at the Neshoba County Fair[13] near Philadelphia, Mississippi, the county where the three civil rights workers were murdered during 1964's Freedom Summer.[14][15][16] Defenders of Reagan's statement pointed out that political speeches from local, state, and national politicians at the fair had been a long-standing tradition dating back to 1896, and that Jack Kemp, John Glenn, and Michael Dukakis among other politicians had spoken there.[17]

In 1976, Jimmy Carter won most of the Southern states without offending northern Democrats, explaining, “I have no trouble pitching for Wallace votes and black votes at the same time."[18]

In 1968, Nixon lost a majority of southern electoral votes to George Wallace while capturing 36 percent of the black vote. His 1972 victory, both Reagan victories, and the victory of George H. W. Bush in 1988 could have been won without their carrying any Southern state. If Nixon's Republican successor, Gerald Ford had won just one-half of the black votes that Nixon won, Ford would have won the election.[來源請求] Bill Clinton, a Southern Democrat, was twice elected president, winning a handful of Southern states in 1992. In 1996, he won more votes outside the South and could have won without carrying any Southern state.[19]

19th century disfranchisement and rise of the Solid South[编辑]

主条目：Solid South

After the American Civil War, southern states gained additional seats in the House of Representatives and representation in the Electoral College because freed slaves were granted full citizenship and suffrage. Southern white resentment stemming from the Civil War and the Republican Party’s policy of Reconstruction kept most southern whites in the Democratic Party, but the Republicans could compete in the South with a coalition of freedmen, Unionists and highland whites.

Rising intimidation and violence by white paramilitary groups such as the White League and Red Shirts who supported the Democratic Party during the mid to late-1870s contributed to the turning out Republican officeholders and suppression of the black vote.[20] After the North agreed to withdraw federal troops under the Compromise of 1877, white Democrats used a variety of tactics to reduce voting by African Americans and poor whites.[21] In the 1880s they began to pass legislation making election processes more complicated. Although the Fourteenth Amendment reduced the Congressional representation of states that denied votes to their adult male citizens, this provision was never enforced.

Editorial cartoon from the January 18, 1879, issue of Harper's Weekly criticizing the use of literacy tests. It shows "Mr. Solid South" writing on the wall, "Eddikashun qualifukashun. The Blak man orter be eddikated afore he kin vote with us Wites."

From 1890 to 1908, the white Democratic legislatures in every Southern state enacted new constitutions or amendments with provisions to disenfranchise most blacks[22] and tens of thousands of poor whites. Provisions required complicated processes for poll taxes, residency, literacy tests, and other requirements which were subjectively applied against blacks. As blacks lost their vote, the Republican Party lost its ability to effectively compete.[23] There was a dramatic drop in voter turnout as these measures took effect, a drop in participation that continued across the South.[24]

The South became solidly white Democratic until past the middle of the 20th century. Effectively, Southern white Democrats controlled all the votes of the expanded population by which Congressional apportionment was figured. Many of their representatives achieved powerful positions of seniority in Congress, giving them control of chairmanships of Congressional committees. Because African Americans could not be voters, they were prevented from being jurors and serving in local offices. Services and institutions for them in the segregated South were chronically underfunded.[25]

During this period, Republicans held only a few House seats from the South. Between 1880 and 1904, Republican presidential candidates in the South received between 35 and 40 percent of that section's vote (except in 1892, when the 16 percent for the Populists knocked Republicans down to 25 percent). From 1904 to 1948, Republicans received more than 30 percent of the section's votes only in the 1920 (35.2 percent, carrying Tennessee) and 1928 elections (47.7 percent, carrying five states). The only important political role of the South in presidential elections came in the 1912 election, when it provided the delegates to select Taft over Theodore Roosevelt in that year's Republican convention.

During this period, Republicans regularly supported anti-lynching bills, which were filibustered by Southern Democrats in the Senate, and appointed a few blacks to office. In the 1928 election, the Republican candidate Herbert Hoover rode the issues of prohibition and anti-Catholicism[26] to carry five former Confederate states, with 62 of the 126 electoral votes of the section. After his victory, Hoover attempted to build up the Republican Party of the South, transferring patronage away from blacks and toward the same kind of white Protestant businessmen who made up the core of the Northern Republican Party. With the onset of the Great Depression, which severely impacted the South, Hoover soon became extremely unpopular. The gains of the Republican Party in the South were lost. In the 1932 election, Hoover received only 18.1 percent of the Southern vote for re-election.

World War II and population changes[编辑]

In the 1948 election, after Harry Truman signed an Executive Order to desegregate the Army, a group of Southern Democrats known as Dixiecrats split from the Democratic Party in reaction to the inclusion of a civil rights plank in the party's platform. This followed a floor fight led by Minneapolis mayor (and soon-to-be senator) Hubert Humphrey. The disaffected Democrats formed the States' Rights Democratic, or Dixiecrat Party, and nominated Governor Strom Thurmond of South Carolina for president. Thurmond carried four southern states in the general election: Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. The main plank of the States' Rights Democratic Party was maintaining segregation and Jim Crow in the South. The Dixiecrats, failing to deny the Democrats the presidency in 1948, soon dissolved, but the split lingered. In 1964, Thurmond was one of the first conservative southern Democrats to switch to the Republican Party.[來源請求]

In addition to the splits in the Democratic Party, the population movements associated with World War II had a significant effect on the makeup of the South. More than 5 million African Americans migrated from the South to the North and West in the second Great Migration lasting from 1940-1970. Starting before WWII, many took jobs in the defense industry in California and major industrial cities of the Midwest.[來源請求]

Changes in industry, growth in universities and the military establishment in turn attracted Northern transplants to the South, and bolstered the base of the Republican Party. In the post-war Presidential campaigns, Republicans did best in the fastest-growing states of the South with the most Northern settlers. In the 1952, 1956 and 1960 elections, Virginia, Tennessee and Florida went Republican, while Louisiana went Republican in 1956, and Texas twice voted for Dwight D. Eisenhower and once for John F. Kennedy. In 1956, Eisenhower received 48.9 percent of the Southern vote, becoming only the second Republican in history (after Ulysses S. Grant) to get a plurality of Southern votes.[來源請求]

The states of the Deep South remained loyal to the Democratic Party, which had not officially repudiated segregation. Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas and North Carolina actually lost congressional seats from the 1950s to the 1970s, while South Carolina, Louisiana and Georgia remained static.[來源請求]

The "Year of Birmingham" in 1963 highlighted racial issues in Alabama. Through the spring, there were marches and demonstrations to end legal segregation. The Movement's achievements in settlement with the local business class were overshadowed by bombings and murders by the Ku Klux Klan, most notoriously in the deaths of four girls in the bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.[27]

After the Democrat George Wallace was elected as Governor of Alabama, he helped link the concept of states' rights and segregation, both in speeches and by creating crises to provoke Federal intervention. He opposed integration at the University of Alabama, and collaborated with the Ku Klux Klan in disrupting court-ordered integration of public schools in Birmingham in 1963.[27]

1964 Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater won his home state of Arizona and five states in the Deep South, depicted in red. The Southern states, traditionally Democratic up to that time, voted Republican primarily as a statement of opposition to the Civil Rights Act, which had been passed by Johnson and the Democrats in Congress earlier that year. Capturing 61.1% of the popular vote and 486 electors, Johnson won in a landslide. Note that Texas went to Johnson due to him being the favorite son.

Many of the states' rights Democrats were attracted to the 1964 presidential campaign of Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. Goldwater was notably more conservative than previous Republican nominees, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower. Goldwater's principal opponent in the primary election, Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York, was widely seen as representing the more moderate (and pro-Civil Rights) Northern wing of the party (see Rockefeller Republican, Goldwater republican).

In the 1964 presidential campaign, Goldwater ran a conservative campaign which broadly opposed strong action by the federal government. Although he had supported all previous federal civil rights legislation, Goldwater made the decision to oppose the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[28] His stance was based on his view that the act was an intrusion of the federal government into the affairs of states and, second, that the Act interfered with the rights of private persons to do business, or not, with whomever they chose, even if the choice is based on racial discrimination.

All this appealed to white Southern Democrats, and Goldwater was the first Republican to win the electoral votes of the Deep South states (Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina) since Reconstruction. However, Goldwater's vote on the Civil Rights Act proved devastating to his campaign everywhere outside the South (other than the South, Goldwater only won in Arizona, his home state), contributing to his landslide defeat in 1964. A Lyndon B. Johnson ad called "Confessions of a Republican," which ran in the North, associated Goldwater with the Ku Klux Klan. At the same time, Johnson’s campaign in the Deep South publicized Goldwater’s full history on civil rights. In the end, Johnson swept the election.

Goldwater’s position was at odds with most of the prominent members of the Republican Party, dominated by so-called Eastern Establishment and Midwestern Progressives. A higher percentage of the Republican Party supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964[28] than did the Democratic Party, as they had on all previous Civil Rights legislation. The Southern Democrats mostly opposed their Northern Party mates — and their presidents (Kennedy and Johnson) on civil rights issues.

In some Republican circles, the election after the 1964 Civil Rights Act was termed, "The Great Betrayal". Even though some Republicans paid a price with white voters — in some cases losing seats — black voters did not return to the Republican fold. Indeed, in some cases, notably the re-election of Senator Al Gore Sr., a majority of black voters cast their votes for a man who voted against the Civil Rights Act.

Roots of the Southern strategy[编辑]

Lyndon Johnson was concerned that his endorsement of Civil Rights legislation would endanger his party in the South. In the 1968 election, Richard Nixon saw the cracks in the Solid South as an opportunity to tap into a group of voters who had historically been beyond the reach of the Republican Party. Much of this strategy was fairly obvious in retrospect given George Wallace's strong display in that election, where he garnered 46 electoral votes and nearly 10 million popular votes, attracting mostly southern Democrats away from Hubert Humphrey. Ted Van Dyk also recounted in his memoirs how - "40 years ago (that) the most disastrous modern-day national political convention convened in Chicago. The 1968 Democratic convention ... set the Democratic Party on a course that it has yet to correct" - as being as likely as anything what Richard Nixon had read in devising his Southern Strategy. [29] [30] [31]

Huey P. Newton, Shirley Chisholm, Andrew Young, and Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts had replaced Martin Luther King Jr. as some of the most prominent black leaders. By this point, King had won the Nobel Peace Prize and founded the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. His death was followed by rioting by African Americans in inner-city areas in major cities throughout the country. King’s policy of non-violence had already been challenged by other African-American leaders such as John Lewis and Stokely Carmichael of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The notion of Black Power advocated by SNCC leaders was quite effective in altering the mood of African-Americans. This attitude did much to raise the expectations of African Americans and also raised racial tensions.[32] Journalists reporting about the demonstrations against the Vietnam War often featured young people engaging in violence or burning draft cards and American flags.[33] There were also many young adults engaged in the drug culture and "free love" (sexual promiscuity), in what was called the "hippie" counter-culture. These actions scandalized many Americans and created a concern about law and order.

Alabama Governor George Wallace

With the aid of Harry Dent and South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, who had switched parties in 1964, Richard Nixon ran his 1968 campaign on states' rights and "law and order." Progressives accused Nixon of pandering to Southern whites, especially with regard to his "states' rights" and "law and order" stands.[34]

The independent candidacy of George Wallace, former Democratic governor of Alabama, partially negated the Southern strategy.[35] With a much more explicit attack on integration and black civil rights, Wallace won all of Goldwater's states (except South Carolina), as well as Arkansas and one of North Carolina's electoral votes. Nixon picked up Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina and Florida, while Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey's only southern state was Texas. Writer Jeffrey Hart who worked on the Nixon campaign as a speechwriter says that Nixon did not have a "Southern Strategy" but "Border State Strategy" as the campaign ceded the Deep South to George Wallace and that the press merely call it a "Southern Strategy" as they are "very lazy".[36]

In the 1972 election, by contrast, Nixon won every state in the Union except Massachusetts, winning more than 70 percent of the popular vote in most of the Deep South (Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina) and 61% of the national vote. He won over 65 percent of the votes in the other states of the former Confederacy. Nixon won 36% of the black vote nationwide. Despite his appeal to Southern whites, Nixon parlayed a wide perception as a moderate into wins in other states. He was able to appear moderate to most Americans because the Southern strategy referred to integration obliquely through references to states' rights and busing. This tactic was later described by supporters of civil rights as "dog-whistle politics."[37]

Evolution[编辑]

Lee Atwater

As civil rights grew more accepted throughout the nation, basing a general election strategy on appeals to "states' rights" that some would believe to be a play against civil rights laws would have resulted in a national backlash. In addition, the idea of "states' rights" was considered by some to be subsumed within a broader meaning than simply a reference to civil rights laws,[4][38] eventually encompassing federalism as the means to forestall Federal intervention in the culture wars.

In addition to presidential campaigns, Democratic charges of racism have been made about subsequent Republican campaigns for the House of Representatives and Senate in the South. The Willie Horton commercials used by supporters of George H. W. Bush against Michael Dukakis in the election of 1988 were considered by many Democrats, including Jesse Jackson, Lloyd Bentsen, and many newspaper editors, to be racist. The 1990 re-election campaign of Jesse Helms attacked his opponent's alleged support of "racial quotas," most notably through an ad in which a white person's hands are seen crumpling a letter indicating that he was denied a job because of the color of his skin.[39]

Bob Herbert, a New York Times columnist, reported a 1981 interview with Lee Atwater, published in Southern Politics in the 1990s by Alexander P. Lamis, in which Lee Atwater discussed politics in the South:

Questioner: But the fact is, isn't it, that Reagan does get to the Wallace voter and to the racist side of the Wallace voter by doing away with legal services, by cutting down on food stamps?

Atwater: You start out in 1954 by saying, "Nigger, nigger, nigger." By 1968 you can't say "nigger" — that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states' rights and all that stuff. You're getting so abstract now [that] you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you're talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that is part of it. I'm not saying that. But I'm saying that if it is getting that abstract, and that coded, that we are doing away with the racial problem one way or the other. You follow me — because obviously sitting around saying, "We want to cut this," is much more abstract than even the busing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract than "Nigger, nigger."[4]

Herbert wrote in the same column, "The truth is that there was very little that was subconscious about the G.O.P.'s relentless appeal to racist whites. Tired of losing elections, it saw an opportunity to renew itself by opening its arms wide to white voters who could never forgive the Democratic Party for its support of civil rights and voting rights for blacks."[1]

In later decades, some analysts made the argument that Southern whites' move to the Republican Party had more to do with whites' voting for their economic interests than racism. Clay Risen wrote in a review of The End of Southern Exceptionalism, a scholarly work by Richard Johnston and Byron Shafer, "In the postwar era, they note, the South transformed itself from a backward region to an engine of the national economy, giving rise to a sizable new wealthy suburban class. This class, not surprisingly, began to vote for the party that best represented its economic interests: the G.O.P. Working-class whites, however — and here’s the surprise — even those in areas with large black populations, stayed loyal to the Democrats."[11]

Some analysts viewed the 1990s as the apogee of Southernization or the Southern strategy, given that the Democratic president Bill Clinton and vice-president Al Gore were from the South, as were Congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle. Cultural values became the battleground of national and local elections.[40]

21st century[编辑]

Few African Americans voted for George W. Bush and other Republicans in the 2004 elections, although it was a higher percentage than any GOP candidate since President Ronald Reagan.[來源請求] Following Bush's re-election, Ken Mehlman, Bush's campaign manager and Chairman of the RNC, held several large meetings with African-American business, community, and religious leaders. In his speeches, he apologized for his party's use of the Southern Strategy in the past. When asked about the strategy of using race as an issue to build GOP dominance in the once-Democratic South, Mehlman replied, "Republican candidates often have prospered by ignoring black voters and even by exploiting racial tensions," and, "by the '70s and into the '80s and '90s, the Democratic Party solidified its gains in the African-American community, and we Republicans did not effectively reach out. Some Republicans gave up on winning the African-American vote, looking the other way or trying to benefit politically from racial polarization. I am here today as the Republican chairman to tell you we were wrong."[41][42]

Recent comments on Southernization and Southern strategy[编辑]

Some commentators considered the decisive victory of Democratic Senator Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election and subsequent re-election in 2012 to represent the decline of Southernization in national politics:

"The region’s absence from Mr. Obama’s winning formula means it's becoming distinctly less important,' said Wayne Parent, a political scientist at Louisiana State University."[40]

“I think that [Southernization]’s absolutely over,” said Thomas Schaller, a political scientist at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, who argued prophetically that the Democrats could win national elections without the South. He noted that the Republicans had become "a Southernized party."[40]

Merle Black, an expert on the region’s politics at Emory University in Atlanta, said the Republican Party went too far in appealing to the South, alienating voters elsewhere."[40]

Republican National Committee chairman Ken Mehlman acknowledged the Southern strategy in 2005, formally apologizing to the NAACP for ignoring the black vote in the previous century.[43]

See also[编辑]

References[编辑]

  1. ^ 1.0 1.1 Herbert, Bob. Impossible, Ridiculous, Repugnant. The New York Times. October 6, 2005. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 
  2. ^ 2.0 2.1 Boyd, James. Nixon's Southern strategy: 'It's All in the Charts' (PDF). The New York Times. May 17, 1970 [2008-08-02]. 
  3. ^ Carter, Dan T. From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994.
  4. ^ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Branch, Taylor. Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years 1963-65. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1999: 242. ISBN 0-684-80819-6. OCLC 37909869. 
  5. ^ 5.0 5.1 Herbert, Bob. Righting Reagan's Wrongs?. The New York Times. November 13, 2007. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 
  6. ^ Black & Black, Earl & Merle. Rise of the Southern Republicans. Harvard University Press. 2003: 442. 
  7. ^ Kalk, Bruce H. The Goldwater Effect, 1962-1966. The Origin of the Southern Strategy. Lanham, Md. [u.a.]: Lexington Books. 2001: 55. ISBN 978-0-7391-0242-8. 
  8. ^ 8.0 8.1 Apple, R.W. Jr. G.O.P. Tries Hard to Win Black Votes, but Recent History Works Against It. The New York Times. September 19, 1996. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 
  9. ^ Javits, Jacob K. To Preserve the Two-Party System. The New York Times. October 27, 1963. 
  10. ^ Phillips, Kevin. The Emerging Republican Majority. New York: Arlington House. 1969. ISBN 0-87000-058-6. OCLC 18063. 
  11. ^ 11.0 11.1 Risen, Clay. The Myth of 'the Southern Strategy'. The New York Times. December 10, 2006 [2008-08-02]. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 
  12. ^ White, Jack. Lott, Reagan and Republican Racism. Time. December 14, 2002. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 
  13. ^ Kornacki, Steve. The "Southern Strategy," fulfilled. Salon. February 3, 2011. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 
  14. ^ Cannon, Lou (2003). Governor Reagan: His Rise to Power, New York: Public Affairs, 477-78.
  15. ^ Michael Goldfield (1997) The Color of Politics: Race and the Mainspring of American Politics, New York: The New Press, 314.
  16. ^ Walton, Hanes. African American Power and Politics. 1997: 20. ISBN 0-231-10419-7, 9780231104197 请检查|isbn=值 (帮助). 
  17. ^ History of the Neshoba County Fair. The Neshoba County Fair. [2010-08-12]. 
  18. ^ Freddoso, David. Jimmy Carter's racist campaign of 1970. The Washington Examiner. September 16, 2009 [2010-04-09]. 
  19. ^ Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. Uselectionatlas.org. [January 22, 2012]. 
  20. ^ George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984, p. 132
  21. ^ Nicholas Lemann, Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War, New York: Farrar Strauss & Giroux, Paperback, 2007, pp.74-80
  22. ^ Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States. New York: HarperCollins. 1999: 205–210,449. ISBN 0-06-052842-7. 
  23. ^ Perman, Michael. Introduction. Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888-1908. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 2001. ISBN 0-8078-2593-X. OCLC 44131788. 
  24. ^ Turnout for Presidential and Midterm Elections. Politics: Historical Barriers to Voting. University of Texas. （原始内容存档于August 1, 2008）. 
  25. ^ "Beginnings of black education", The Civil Rights Movement in Virginia. Virginia Historical Society. Retrieved April 12, 2009.
  26. ^ Dobbs, Ricky Floyd. Continuities in American anti-Catholicism: the Texas Baptist Standard and the coming of the 1960 election.. Baptist History and Heritage. January 1, 2007. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 
  27. ^ 27.0 27.1 McWhorter, Diane. Carry Me Home: Birmingham, Alabama, The Climactic Battle of the Civil Rights Revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2001. ISBN 0-684-80747-5. OCLC 45376386. 
  28. ^ 28.0 28.1 Civil Rights Act of 1964 - CRA - Title VII - Equal Employment Opportunities - 42 US Code Chapter 21. Finduslaw.com. [January 22, 2012]. 
  29. ^ Risen, Clay (March 5, 2006). "How the South was won". 需付费查阅 The Boston Globe. Retrieved 2007-02-11
  30. ^ Thomas R. Dye, Louis Schubert, Harmon Zeigler. The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics. Cengage Learning. 2011
  31. ^ Ted Van Dyk. How the Election of 1968 Reshaped the Democratic Party -- Van Dyk's memoir, "Heroes, Hacks and Fools," recounts advising Democratic presidents and presidential candidates from the early 1960s to 1992.. Wall Street Journal. 2008
  32. ^ Zinn, Howard (1999) A People's History of the United States New York:HarperCollins, 457-461
  33. ^ Zinn, Howard (1999) A People's History of the United States New York:HarperCollins, 491
  34. ^ Johnson, Thomas A. Negro Leaders See Bias in Call Of Nixon for 'Law and Order'. The New York Times. August 13, 1968: 27 [2008-08-02]. 需付费查阅
  35. ^ Childs, Marquis. Wallace's Victory Weakens Nixon's Southern Strategy. The Morning Record. June 8, 1970. 
  36. ^ Hart, Jeffrey. The Making of the American Conservative Mind (television). Hanover, New Hampshire: C-SPAN. 2006-02-09. 
  37. ^ Greenberg, David. Dog-Whistling Dixie: When Reagan said "states' rights," he was talking about race.. Slate. November 20, 2007. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 
  38. ^ Carter, Dan T. From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994.
  39. ^ Helms' "Hands" campaign ad on YouTube
  40. ^ 40.0 40.1 40.2 40.3 Nossiter, Adam. For South, a Waning Hold on National Politics. The New York Times. November 10, 2008. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 
  41. ^ Allen, Mike. RNC Chief to Say It Was 'Wrong' to Exploit Racial Conflict for Votes. Washington Post. July 14, 2005 [2008-08-02]. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 
  42. ^ Benedetto, Richard. GOP: 'We were wrong' to play racial politics. USA Today. July 14, 2005 [January 22, 2012]. 
  43. ^ Rondy, John. GOP ignored black vote, chairman says: RNC head apologizes at NAACP meeting. The Boston Globe. Reuters. July 15, 2005. （原始内容存档于January 22, 2012）. 

Further reading[编辑]

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