证词 (哲学)

在哲学中，证词或证言（英语：testimony）是一个实体（个人或团体等）向另一个实体传达的命题，无论是透过言语、文字还是面部表情，都是基于实体的知识库。^[1] 如果条件满足评估表达者的可靠性（其证词是否经常是真实的）和接收者拥有积极的理由（例如，表达者没有偏见）等条件，则基于证词相信的命题是合理的。^[2]

我们也可以理性地接受基于他人证词的主张，除非发现以下至少一项是真实的：

该主张是不可信的
引述主张的人或来源缺乏可信度
该主张超出了该人根据其自身经验和能力所能了解的范围^[3]

参考资料[编辑]

^ Audi, Robert, The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification, Rational Belief, Oxford University Press: 217–236, 2015-09-01, ISBN 978-0-19-022184-3, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0012
^ Lackey, Jennifer. Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission. The Philosophical Quarterly. 1999, 49 (197): 471–490. ISSN 0031-8094. JSTOR 2660497. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00154.
^ Trudy Govier. A practical study of Argument 6th. 2005 [1985]. ISBN 9780534605254. For the notion of testimony in general, and especially after David Hume, see the seminal research by C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford 1992.

[1] Audi, Robert, The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification, Rational Belief, Oxford University Press: 217–236, 2015-09-01, ISBN 978-0-19-022184-3, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.003.0012

[2] Lackey, Jennifer. Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission. The Philosophical Quarterly. 1999, 49 (197): 471–490. ISSN 0031-8094. JSTOR 2660497. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00154.

[3] Trudy Govier. A practical study of Argument 6th. 2005 [1985]. ISBN 9780534605254. For the notion of testimony in general, and especially after David Hume, see the seminal research by C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford 1992.

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