用戶:Rush FTK/TR:test

這是一個維基百科用戶Rush FTK翻譯的版本的臨時存檔，為避免頻繁修改，直至一定程度前都不會在主頁面上修改。 歡迎同行在本頁面的討論頁面為我提出一些翻譯意見，請不要修改此頁面，謝謝合作。

===當前翻譯條目：轟炸新加坡

  此用戶頁的主題是1944-1945年間盟軍對新加坡進行空襲的軍事行動。關於1941年日軍對新加坡進行空襲的軍事行動，請見「轟炸新加坡」。

轟炸新加坡 (1944–1945)
太平洋戰爭, 第二次世界大戰的一部分
1941年5月期間第九海軍基地的干船塢在新加坡海軍基地浮動。 這個干船塢是USAAF在1945年的突襲目標。
日期 1944年11月5日 – 1945年5月24日 地點 新加坡 及其附近海域 結果 戰術未定義
參戰方
美國 英國	大日本帝國
兵力
第20轟炸機軍團 第222英國皇家空軍團	防空高射炮以及戰鬥機單位
傷亡與損失
9架轟炸機損毀	海軍,油庫以及船塢受損 至少4艘船隻損毀，11艘船隻受傷

　　轟炸新加坡(1944–1945) 是一場由盟軍空軍部隊在第二次世界大戰期間發起的軍事戰爭。在1944年11月至1945年3月間美國陸軍航空隊 (USAAF)利用長距轟炸機針對被日本佔領的新加坡地區進行了11次進行空襲.儘管在附近海域已經進行了布雷,大多數突襲還是針對海軍基地和修船廠.在美軍轟炸機調離之後，直到1945年5月24日以前，新加坡附近的布雷任務一直由英國皇家空軍所承擔.
　　這次突襲效果好壞參半.儘管對新加坡重要的海軍基地及商業港口進行重創,但對其他次要目標的突襲卻並未成功;另外對於新加坡附近海域島上的石油貯藏基地也並未奏效.布雷活動令日軍在新加坡附近地區陷入癱瘓,並導致3艘軍被損毀,近10艘軍艦受損.但這次戰役並不是決定性的.儘管如此,盟軍的這次空襲依然成功的鼓舞了新加坡的普通民眾,他們認為襲擊標誌着城市即將被解放.儘管其中一次對軍事設施的轟炸使得大量被誤殺,並造成數百人流離失所.但就整體情況而言,平民傷亡量並不算高.

背景

參見：新加坡日治時期和馬特霍恩作戰

In the decades after World War I, Britain expanded 新加坡海軍基地 at Sembawang on Singapore's north coast as part of plans to deter Japanese expansionism in the region (the Singapore strategy). The resulting facility was among the most important in the British Empire and included the large King George VI Graving Dock and Admiralty IX Floating Dry Dock. The Commonwealth forces allocated to Malaya and Singapore were swiftly defeated in the months after the outbreak of the Pacific War, however, and the island was surrendered to the Japanese on 15 February 1942. Singapore was bombed by Japanese aircraft on a number of occasions during the Battle of Malaya and subsequent fighting on the island itself; these raids caused many civilian deaths.

The ocean liner 「RMS」號 in the King George VI Graving Dock during August 1940.

Singapore Naval Base suffered little damage during the fighting in 1941 and 1942, and became the most important facility of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) outside the Japanese home islands. As was the case under British rule, many locally-recruited civilians worked in the base, though the Japanese Navy subjected them to harsh discipline which included physical beatings for minor mistakes as well as imprisonment or execution for theft and leaks of information. The Japanese Second Fleet and Third Fleet were transferred from the central Pacific to Singapore and the nearby Lingga Islands between February and April 1944 to be closer to their sources of fuel oil. These two fleets comprised the main body of the IJN, and operated most of its remaining battleships and aircraft carriers.

駐守新加坡的日軍防備能力不強。1945年初只有兩個師擁有機炮, some IJN anti-aircraft units, and a small number of fighter aircraft. Some of the anti-aircraft guns were crewed by Malay auxiliaries. The effectiveness of what was already an inadequate air defence force was hindered by a lack of coordination between the Army and Navy, shortages of fire control equipment for the guns, and no fire-control radar or barrage balloons being available. Defence against night raids was particularly weak as no night fighters were stationed near Singapore and coordination between the anti-aircraft guns and searchlight units was poor.

In June 1944, the USAAF's XX Bomber Command began flying combat operations with B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers from air bases near Kharagpur in northeastern India. Although the Command's primary role was to attack industrial targets in the Japanese home islands, approximately 50 percent of its missions were undertaken to support other Allied operations in the Pacific. The XX Bomber Command reported to the USAAF's Twentieth Air Force, which was personally directed from Washington, DC, by the commander of the USAAF General Henry H. Arnold, rather than the Allied theatre commanders in India and China. Major General Curtis LeMay assumed command of XX Bomber Command on 29 August after Arnold relieved its first commander.

Following the Japanese defeat in the Battle of Leyte Gulf in late October 1944, the remnants of the IJN were concentrated into two groups of ships. One group returned to bases in the Inland Sea, while the other was stationed at the Lingga Islands. On 27 October, Arnold suggested to LeMay that the Japanese defeat at Leyte may have increased the importance of Singapore's naval facilities and asked whether XX Bomber Command could attack targets on the island. Little recent intelligence on Singapore was available, and on 30 October a photo-reconnaissance B-29 overflew Singapore for the first time and took good photos of the island. Despite this success, LeMay's staff believed that a daylight attack on Singapore—which required a 4,000 mi（6,400 km） round trip from Kharagpur—could not be successful. Regardless, Arnold ordered that XX Bomber Command attack Singapore.

突襲

Locations of B-29 bomber bases in India and Ceylon and the main targets they attacked in Southeast Asia

初始攻擊

對新加坡的第一次突襲發生在 1944 年 11 月 5 日。XX 轟炸機司令部從卡拉格普爾周圍的基地派出了 76 架 B-29。由於距離目標很遠，這架飛機每架僅配備兩枚 1,000 磅炸彈；飛行員還被指示從低於正常高度的高度進行轟炸20,000英尺（6,100米）,並保持鬆散的陣型。突襲的主要目標是喬治六世國王墓地碼頭，北部 蘇門答臘的龐卡南布郎丹（Pangkalanbrandan）煉油廠被指定為次要目標。

第一架 B-29 於 06:44 抵達新加坡海軍基地。轟炸非常準確，先頭飛機將炸彈置於墓地碼頭 caisson 大門的 50英尺（15米） 內。第三架 B-29 的炸彈落在附近，其他飛機也直接擊中了墳場，使其無法使用三個月。降落在喬治六世國王墓地碼頭及其附近的炸彈還損壞了當時正在碼頭修理的 465英尺（142米） 貨輪。碼頭內外的許多文職人員無法逃脫並被殺害。襲擊者還對海軍基地的其他設施造成了破壞。總體而言，53 座超級堡壘轟炸了新加坡海軍基地，而 7 座襲擊了 龐卡南布郎丹（Pangkalanbrandan）煉油廠。很少有日本高射炮或飛機向襲擊者開火，但有兩架 B-29 在事故中丟失。 這次襲擊是迄今為止進行的最長的白天轟炸行動。 Following the attack, Japanese soldiers murdered a group of injured Indonesian workers. 喬治六世國王墓地碼頭的損壞意味着它無法用於修復在雷伊泰灣海戰中受損的日本戰列艦。

Later bombing raids

直到 1945 年 1 月才對新加坡進行下一次突襲。據報道，在 菲律賓戰役 中受損的日本軍艦正在新加坡進行維修，一支由 47 艘超級堡壘組成的部隊從印度派出攻擊海軍部IX浮動碼頭以及該島南海岸的國王碼頭。這些飛機於 1 月 10 日午夜左右起飛，並於 1 月 11 日 08:20 開始抵達新加坡上空。只有 27 名襲擊者襲擊了碼頭，由於 柔佛海峽 日本軍艦的猛烈防空火力，轟炸機沒有造成任何損害。剩餘的飛機轟炸了馬來亞的 Penang、緬甸的 Mergui 和幾個機會目標，但一般都沒有成功。在這次行動中，兩架 B-29 丟失。

In January 1945, XX Bomber Command began preparations to redeploy to the Mariana Islands. The Command ceased its attacks on Japan and East Asia, for which it used bases in China to refuel the B-29s en route to their targets, and instead focused on targets in Southeast Asia that could be reached from Kharagpur. As there were few industrial targets within range of Kharagpur, the highest priority was given to attacking shipping in major ports such as Rangoon, Bangkok and Singapore as well as smaller harbours. Attacks were conducted through both conventional bombing and laying naval mines. As part of the transition, LeMay departed for the Mariana Islands on 18 January and was replaced by Brigadier General Roger M. Ramsey.

XX Bomber Command conducted a major conventional bombing raid on Singapore Naval Base on 1 February. On that day, 112 B-29s were dispatched, each armed with four 1,000磅（450公斤） bombs. The raid's primary target, the Admiralty IX Floating Dock, was bombed by 67 of the 88 aircraft that reached Singapore. This attack sank the dry dock and destroyed the 460英尺（140米） ship berthed inside it. The other 21 aircraft that attacked Singapore bombed the West Wall area of the naval base and destroyed many buildings and some heavy equipment; this area housed the base's main offices. Of the remaining aircraft, 20 diverted and attacked targets in Penang and Martaban. A Japanese fighter shot down one of the B-29s and another Superfortress was destroyed on landing after suffering damage from air attack.

Primary targets of the USAAF raids on Singapore.
(Note: This map depicts Singapore's modern coastline, not the World War II-era coastline.)

Although XX Bomber Command began preparations to attack on Singapore Naval Base again on 6 February, this raid was cancelled on the third of the month by Admiral Louis Mountbatten, the commander of Allied forces in the Southeast Asian theatre. Mountbatten ordered that the naval installations at Singapore and Penang not be targeted as they would be needed by Allied forces following the projected liberation of Malaya and Singapore later in 1945. After requesting clarification of this order, Ramsey met with Mountbatten at Kandy. In this meeting Mountbatten assigned targets in the Kuala Lumpur area as XX Bomber Command's first priority, while second priority was given to carefully selected areas of Singapore. These areas excluded the King George VI Graving Dock and several other docks and areas with heavy machinery, but allowed attacks on the West Wall area of Singapore Naval Base, naval oil stores and commercial dock facilities. Saigon was assigned as XX Bomber Command's third priority and fourth priority was given to oil storage dumps on islands near Singapore.

The next bombing raid on Singapore took place on 24 February. On that day, 116 B-29s were dispatched to bomb the Empire Dock area at Singapore's southern tip. This was a commercial dock, and was considered by XX Bomber Command planners to be "the only suitable primary target free of stipulations left in this theatre". The bombers were armed with incendiary bombs, and the 105 B-29s which reached Singapore succeeded in burning out 39 percent of the warehouse area near the dock. As a result of the target being obscured by smoke, 26 of the B-29s used blind rather than visual bombing, resulting in poor accuracy and damage to civilian residential and commercial areas near the dock area. The Syonan Shimbun newspaper subsequently reported that 396 people had been made homeless by the raid. USAAF losses from the raid were limited to a single B-29 which crashed after running out of fuel on its way back to India.

The oil tanks at Samboe Island (pictured in 1936) were one of the targets attacked on 12 March 1945

XX Bomber Command attacked Singapore again on 2 March. As many of the Command's service units were en route to the Marianas, only 64 B-29s could be dispatched. These aircraft targeted the shop and warehouse area in Singapore Naval Base with 500磅（230公斤） bombs. The 49 B-29s which reached Singapore bombed this area and added to the damage caused by earlier raids, but the results of the attack were again limited by anti-aircraft fire from Japanese warships. Two B-29s were shot down by anti-aircraft guns during the raid.

The final two raids conducted by XX Bomber Command before it deployed to the Marianas targeted oil storage facilities on islands in the Singapore area. On 12 March, three B-29 groups were dispatched to attack Bukom and Sebarok islands just off the south coast of Singapore as well as Samboe Island, which is a few miles south near Batam Island in the Dutch East Indies. Each of the groups was assigned a different island and no Japanese anti-aircraft guns or fighters were encountered. Despite this, poor weather meant that the 44 B-29s which reached the target area had to use blind bombing techniques and their attacks caused little damage. The command's final attack before it departed for the Marianas took place on the night of 29/30 March when 29 Superfortresses were sent to attack Bukom Island. In order to train the aircrew for the low-level tactics which were being used against the Japanese home islands, the bombers attacked their targets individually from altitudes between 5,000英尺（1,500米） and 7,000英尺（2,100米）. This raid succeeded in destroying seven of the 49 oil tanks in the island, and a further three were damaged. No B-29s were lost in either raid.

Minelaying near Singapore

As part of its campaign against shipping, around each full moon from late January 1945 XX Bomber Command conducted minelaying missions. On the night of 25/26 January, 41 B-29s from the 444th and 468th Bombardment Groups laid six minefields in the approaches to Singapore. On the same night other B-29s laid mines off Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay as part of the largest aerial minelaying effort in the Pacific up to that time. On the night of 27/28 February, twelve B-29s were dispatched to lay mines in the Straits of Johor near Singapore. Ten of these aircraft successfully deployed 55 mines in the target area, and another aircraft mined Penang. During the next full moon period on the night of 28/29 March, 22 B-29s laid mines near Singapore. No aircraft were lost during these missions.

Following the withdrawal of XX Bomber Command, the British Royal Air Force's No. 222 Group assumed responsibility for minelaying operations in the Singapore area using B-24 Liberator bombers. Minelaying ceased on 24 May so that unswept mines did not interfere with the planned British-led landings in Malaya which were scheduled for September. The Japanese established observation posts on islands in the Singapore Strait to spot minefields, but these were not effective and generally the fields were not detected until a ship struck a mine. In total, air-dropped mines sank three ships near Singapore and damaged another ten. Moreover, the minefields disrupted Japanese convoy routes and efforts to repair ships. The Allied minelaying campaign was, however, too brief to achieve decisive results.

Aftermath

A Royal Air Force motor transport driver surveys damage caused by Allied bombing at Singapore docks, September 1945.

XX Bomber Command's attacks on Singapore produced mixed results. The raids on Singapore Naval Base damaged or destroyed many workshops and denied the Japanese the use of the King George VI Graving Dock between late 1944 and early 1945, and the Admiralty IX Dry Dock from February 1945. In addition, workers at the Naval Base did not return to work for some time after each raid, and had to be provided with better pay and rations and additional air-raid shelters. Although the damage inflicted on the Empire Docks area impeded Japanese port operations, the poor condition of the port area also hindered British efforts to rehabilitate Singapore following the war. The attacks on the oil storage tanks on islands near Singapore were less successful, and many were found to still be operable after the Japanese surrender.

The Japanese military's efforts to defend Singapore from air attack were unsuccessful. Due to the weak state of the island's air defences, only nine B-29s were shot down during the American campaign, all of them during daylight raids. Minesweeping operations were also slow, and it took three weeks to declare the port safe after each Allied minelaying raid. The surviving crew members of the American bombers that were shot down met varying fates; a small number linked up with resistance movements such as the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army, while others were captured by the Japanese and held in harsh conditions. Those who were captured by the IJN and held at the Naval Base were beheaded. After the war, Japanese personnel responsible for atrocities against these prisoners were hanged or given long prison terms during the Seletar War Crimes Trials.

The air raids on Singapore raised the morale of the island's civilian population. They were seen as heralding Singapore's liberation from Japan's oppressive rule, though civilians were generally careful to hide this belief from Japanese occupation personnel. The B-29s were widely seen as invulnerable, and civilians were cheered by their apparent ability to attack the Japanese at will. To counter this view, the occupation authorities exhibited wreckage from downed B-29s and surviving crew members, as well as film footage of a Superfortress being shot down, but without success. The Japanese also failed in their attempts to rouse Singapore's Muslim population against the raids by highlighting damage done to a mosque on 11 January and 24 February, the latter a raid which coincided with the celebration of Muhammad's birthday. Another factor which contributed to public support for the raids was that the policy of targeting military installations meant that only a limited number of civilians became casualties, and the American bombing came to be seen as highly accurate. The expectation of further attacks caused the prices of food and other commodities to rise, however, as people stockpiled necessities; Japanese attempts to stop this hoarding and profiteering were not successful.

參考資料

Bibliography

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• Toh, Boon Kwan. "It was a thrill to see rows of B-29s going through the sky" The American Strategic Bombing of Singapore, 1944–45. The Journal of Military History. 3 (Society for Military History). 2009, 73. 
• Wolk, Herman S. Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan. Denton: University of North Texas Press. 2010. ISBN 1-57441-281-7. 

拓展閱讀

• Mann, Robert A. The B-29 Superfortress Chronology, 1934–1960. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. 2009. ISBN 0-7864-4274-3. 
• Murfett, Malcolm H.; et al. Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore From First Settlement to Final British Withdrawal. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 1999. ISBN 0-19-588482-5.