取消主义

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(重定向自取消唯物論
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取消主义(英語:eliminative materialism),也称作取消唯物主义,观点是人们常识中的“心灵”是虚假的,大多数人相信的精神状态中特定的部分也不存在。[1]这个立场属于唯物主义(materialism)。一些取消主义的支持者认为,很多日常中的心理学概念,比如信念和欲望,是没有对应的神经基础的,因为这些概念没有确切的定义。相反,他们认为,行为和经验心理学概念应该以这样一个标准评定,即它们被还原到生物学层面还原得有多好。[2]还有其他取消主义者认为,类似痛苦、视觉感知等精神状态都是不存在的。[3]


参考文献[编辑]

  1. ^ Ramsey, William. Eliminative Materialism. (编) Zalta, Edward N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2016-01-01. 
  2. ^ Lycan, W. G. & Pappas, G. (1972) "What is eliminative materialism?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:149-59.
  3. ^ Rey, G. (1983). "A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness", in R. Davidson, G. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds), Consciousness and Self-Regulation Vol 3. New York, Plenum: 1-39.

推荐阅读[编辑]

  • Baker, L. (1987). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-02050-7.
  • Broad, C. D. (1925). The Mind and its Place in Nature. London, Routledge & Kegan. ISBN 0-415-22552-3 (2001 Reprint Ed.).
  • Churchland, P.M. (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. New York, Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. ISBN 0-521-33827-1.
  • Churchland, P.M. (1988). Matter and Consciousness, revised Ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-53074-0.
  • Rorty, Richard. "Mind-body Identity, Privacy and Categories" in The Review of Metaphysics XIX:24-54. Reprinted Rosenthal, D.M. (ed.) 1971.
  • Stich, S. (1996). Deconstructing the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-512666-1.

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