因果的封闭性

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物理的因果封闭性是一个形而上学的理论,关于physical领域中因果的本质,在形上學心灵哲学研究中有重要影响。很强的描述是这样的:物理的因果封闭性认为,“所有物理状态都是‘纯粹的’物理结果”(金在权语)[1] ,或者说,“物理结果‘只能’有物理原因”(Agustin Vincente语)。[2]

大部分接受这个理论的人,倾向于接受物理主义观点,即所有实体都存在且是物理实体。正如卡尔·波普尔说道,“物理主义者地原则是物理的封闭性……具有决定性意义的重要性,而且我把它当作是物理主义或唯物主义的原则。”[3]

定义[编辑]

物理的因果封闭性有强和弱两种形式。[4]

强的形式断言,没有任何物理活动有物理领域之外的原因(金在权语)。[1] 也就是说,断言对于所有物理事件,物理原因之外的所有原因都不存在。[5]

弱的形式断言,“所有物理事件都有物理原因。”(Barbara Montero语)[4] 或者,“所有物理的结果都有物理上充足的原因。”(Agustin Vincente语)[2] 或者,“如果我们跟踪物理时间的因果来源,我们需要永远不走出物理领域。”(金在权语)[1] 弱的物理因果封闭性和因果完全性是同义词,[6] 即“所有物理结果都有充足的物理原因”。[5] 也就是说,弱形式允许,在物理原因之外,增加一些可能不是物理性质的,但能造成物理结果的原因。

还原论的概念补充了物理的因果封闭性,认为所有事件都可以最终地还原到物理事件。在这些情况下,心灵事件是物理事件的子集和结果。[7]

重要性[编辑]

批评[编辑]

物理因果的封闭性,其有效性一直遭到质疑。[8] 当代,有人指出科学扎根于通过调查剔除主观的东西,寻找客观的东西。以观察者的身份,第三人称的视角,有些哲学家认为是永远不能验证主观问题的(例如意识自由意志)。[9][10][11] 还有批评认为,由Hodgson的讨论,科学自己不能支撑物理因果的封闭性。[12] 还有哲学家批判了这一论证,即支持目的論和基于灵魂的心物关系来论证物理因果的封闭性。[13]

忽视现象[编辑]

参见[编辑]

参考[编辑]

  1. ^ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Jaegwon Kim. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press. 1993: 280. ISBN 978-0521439961. 
  2. ^ 2.0 2.1 Vicente, A. On the Causal Completeness of Physics (PDF). International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 2006, 20 (2): 149–171. doi:10.1080/02698590600814332. 
  3. ^ Popper and Eccles, Karl. The Self and its Brain. New York: Springer. 1977: 51. ISBN 978-0415058988. 
  4. ^ 4.0 4.1 Barbara Montero. Chapter 8: Varieties of causal closure. (编) Sven Walter; Heinz-Dieter Heckmann. Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic. 2003: 173 ff. ISBN 978-0907845461. 
  5. ^ 5.0 5.1 Sahotra Sarkar; Jessica Pfeifer. Physicalism: The causal impact argument. Physicalism. The Philosophy of Science: N-Z, Index. Taylor & Francis: 566. 2006. ISBN 978-0415977104. 
  6. ^ Max Velmans; Susan Schneider. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. John Wiley & Sons. 15 April 2008 [6 February 2013]. ISBN 978-0-470-75145-9. 
  7. ^ Jaegwon Kim. The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. 1989, 63 (3): 31–47. JSTOR 3130081. doi:10.2307/3130081. 
  8. ^ Benjamin Libet; Anthony Freeman; Keith Sutherland. Editors' introduction: The volitional brain. The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Academic. 2000: ixxxii. ISBN 9780907845119. 
  9. ^ > FT Hong. Vladimir B. Bajić; Tin Wee Tan, 编. Information Processing and Living Systems. Imperial College Press. 2005: 388. ISBN 9781860946882. The origination of free will is an illusion from the third-person perspective. However, it is a reality from the first-person perspective... 
  10. ^ > Thomas Nagel. Chapter 4: Cognition. Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False. Oxford University Press. 2012: 71. ISBN 9780199919758. [Higher-level cognitive capacities] cannot be understood through physical science alone, and..their existence cannot be explained by a version of evolutionary theory that is physically reductive. 
  11. ^ U Mohrhoff. The physics of interactionism. (编) Benjamin Libet; Anthony Freeman; Keith Sutherland. The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Academic. 2000: 166. ISBN 9780907845119. But the laws of physics presuppose causal closure...Hence it follows that the behaviour of matter in the presence of a causally efficacious non-material mind cannot be fully governed by those laws. 
  12. ^ David Hodgson. Chapter 7: Science and determinism. Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will. Oxford University Press. 2012. ISBN 9780199845309.  Hodgson relies upon the free will theorem英语free will theorem1,2 of scientists John Conway and Simon Kochen based upon the role of the observer in quantum mechanics, which supports the view that "belief in determinism may thus come to be seen as notably unscientific." (p. 121)
  13. ^ Stewart Goetz; Charles Taliaferro. Strict naturalism, purposeful explanation, and freedom. Naturalism (Intervensions) Paperback. Eerdmans. 2008: 26. ISBN 978-0802807687.