取消主義
外觀
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取消主義(英語:eliminative materialism),也稱作取消唯物主義,觀點是人們常識中的「心靈」是虛假的,大多數人相信的精神狀態中特定的部分也不存在。[1]這個立場屬於唯物主義(materialism)。一些取消主義的支持者認為,很多日常中的心理學概念,比如信念和欲望,是沒有對應的神經基礎的,因為這些概念沒有確切的定義。相反,他們認為,行為和經驗心理學概念應該以這樣一個標準評定,即它們被還原到生物學層面還原得有多好。[2]還有其他取消主義者認為,類似痛苦、視覺感知等精神狀態都是不存在的。[3]
參考文獻
[編輯]- ^ Ramsey, William. Eliminative Materialism. Zalta, Edward N. (編). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2016-01-01 [2020-02-20]. (原始內容存檔於2020-02-20).
- ^ Lycan, W. G. & Pappas, G. (1972) "What is eliminative materialism?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:149-59.
- ^ Rey, G. (1983). "A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness", in R. Davidson, G. Schwartz and D. Shapiro (eds), Consciousness and Self-Regulation Vol 3. New York, Plenum: 1-39.
推薦閱讀
[編輯]- Baker, L. (1987). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-02050-7.
- Broad, C. D. (1925). The Mind and its Place in Nature. London, Routledge & Kegan. ISBN 0-415-22552-3 (2001 Reprint Ed.).
- Churchland, P.M. (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. New York, Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. ISBN 0-521-33827-1.
- Churchland, P.M. (1988). Matter and Consciousness, revised Ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-53074-0.
- Rorty, Richard. "Mind-body Identity, Privacy and Categories" in The Review of Metaphysics XIX:24-54. Reprinted Rosenthal, D.M. (ed.) 1971.
- Stich, S. (1996). Deconstructing the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-512666-1.
外部連結
[編輯]- Bibliography on Eliminative Materialismat (頁面存檔備份,存於網際網路檔案館)
- Eliminative and Multiplicative Materialism by Albert P. Carpenter
- Eliminative Materialism(頁面存檔備份,存於網際網路檔案館) at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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