认知的封闭
科学哲学和心灵哲学中，认知的封闭是指，人类的心灵是没有能力解决一些讨论了很久的哲学问题的。[1] 欧文·弗兰纳根把这种立场叫做非建设性自然主义。新神秘主义的首提倡者柯林·麦金，[2][3]称其为先验自然主义，承认解决方法可能只能由某种非人类智慧生物提出。根据麦金，难以解决的哲学问题包括心物问题、人格同一性、意义问题、自由意志以及知识论，无论是从先天证明的角度，还是从经验主义的立场[4]。
人物
[编辑]- 柯林·麦金
- 哈耶克：对于弗里德里希·哈耶克，解释心灵问题本身就是个逻辑上的矛盾，这种不完全性（心灵解释自己的无能）是哥德尔不完备定理的一个例子。哈耶克不是自然主义不可知论者，即那些认为科学目前不能提供身心问题解释的人。哈耶克认为，彻底上，这个问题就是解不开。[5]
- 约翰·廷德尔：见John Tyndall (1871)，Fragments of Science。
现象和本体
[编辑]伊曼努尔·康德在《纯粹理性批判》中，认为人类的思想不可避免地受到范畴的限制。
量的范畴 – 单一、多数、全体
这些限制了人类的思维。可以了解的是现象，范畴之外不可了解的是本体，即物自体。
新神秘主义
[编辑]变成蝙蝠会怎样？汤玛斯·内格尔这样发问。 他提到了对于经验的主观性认知封闭的可能性，以及其对于唯物主义、还原论、科学的意义。 欧文·弗拉纳根在1991年的著作《心灵的科学》（Science of the Mind）中提到，一些当代思想家认为意识永远不会得到解释。弗拉纳根把他们叫做“新神秘主义者”，根据的是乐队Question Mark and the Mysterians的名字[7]根据麦金，心物问题的正确答案不能被理解，深深地写在我们的基因里面。
显现唯物论是个类似但不同的理论，认为人类还不够聪明以决定“心灵与物质的关系”。[来源请求][可疑]
批判
[编辑]尽管意识的本性是复杂的，但是根据一些哲学家，这并不意味著认知的封闭性，因此，麦金的论证是错误的。[8][9][10]
参见
[编辑]参考资料
[编辑]- ^ Leslie Marsh (ed.), Hayek in Mind: Hayek's Philosophical Psychology, Emerald Group Publishing, 2011, p. xv.
- ^ Harris, Errol E, Reflections on the Problem of Consciousness: 51, 2006,
McGinn's stance, while he denies the possibility of ever understanding the causal connection, may be regarded as "naturalistic" in the sense that he does not reject the validity of neuro-physiological theory, and does not doubt that brain activity accompanies conscious states.
. - ^ Ross Wilson (ed.), The Meaning of "Life" in Romantic Poetry and Poetics, Routledge, 2009, p. 88: "[McGinn] calls his stance "transcendental naturalism..."
- ^ McGinn, Colin. The Problem of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies. 1994, 76 (2–3): 133–56 [2020-02-25]. doi:10.1007/bf00989821. （原始内容存档于2019-12-10）.
it combines deep epistemic transcendence with the denial that what thus transcends is thereby non-natural.
- ^ Butos, W.N. The Social Science of Hayek's The Sensory Order. Advances in [[奥地利经济学派|]]. Emerald. 2010: 127–28 [2020-02-25]. ISBN 978-1-84950975-6. （原始内容存档于2020-08-12）.
1. Explanation is delimited by the apparatus of classification (the mind)... 2. An apparatus of classification cannot explain anything more complex than itself... 3. Therefore, the mind cannot fully explain itself...
- ^ Chomsky, Noam, Language and problems of knowledge: 152, 1988.
- ^ Flanagan, Owen. The Science of the Mind. 麻省理工学院出版社. 1991: 313. ISBN 978-0-262-56056-6.
- ^ Garvey, James. What Does McGinn Think We Cannot Know?. Analysis. July 1997, 57 (3): 196–201. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00074.
Nothing he says gets him the conclusion that we cannot solve the mind-body problem, given any of these interpretations of what is cognitively closed to us
- ^ Kirk, Robert. Why Shouldn't We Be Able to Solve the Mind-Body Problem?. Analysis. January 1991, 51 (1): 17–23. JSTOR 3328626. doi:10.2307/3328626.
He recognizes that many will find this outrageous; and indeed I think that his reasoning is fundamentally flawed and his central thesis false. But it will be worth trying to discover what has gone wrong.
- ^ Kriegel, Uriah. The new mysterianism and the thesis of cognitive closure. Acta Analytica. December 2003, 18 (1–2): 177–191. doi:10.1007/s12136-003-1020-1.
it is incoherent to suppose that we cannot understand what would count as a solution to a problem we can and do understand