功能主義 (心靈哲學)
外觀
功能主義,也稱機能主義是心靈哲學中的觀點之一,認為心靈狀態(信念、欲望、痛苦等)都僅僅基於它們的功能角色。功能角色是,一個心靈狀態與其他心靈狀態(其他人的心靈)之間的關係,感官輸入和行為輸出。[1] 功能主義是同一理論和行為主義的發展演變。
多重實現
[編輯]多重實現是功能主義的重要部分。根據標準的功能主義理論,心靈狀態回應功能角色。它們像閥門一樣,一個閥門可以由塑料或鐵等等構成,只要它們能當作閥門來用。類似地,功能主義者認為,心靈狀態也可以被解釋,而不需要什麼實現它們的物理的中介(例如大腦),人們只需要考慮更高層面的功能即可。
但是,也有功能主義理論與同一理論相組合,否定了多重現實。例如Functional Specification Theories (FSTs) (Levin, § 3.4)。最著名的支持這個觀點的人是大衛·劉易斯[2]和戴維·阿姆斯特朗.[3] 根據FSTs,心靈狀態是功能角色的特殊「實現者」,而不是功能角色本身。
類型
[編輯]機械狀態的功能主義
[編輯]![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3d/Maquina.png/220px-Maquina.png)
心靈功能主義
[編輯]分析功能主義
[編輯]人體功能主義
[編輯]機械功能主義
[編輯]批判
[編輯]批判這一理論的反例,可見於中文屋、中文腦和倒錯光譜、孿生地球。
參見
[編輯]參考資料
[編輯]- ^ Block, Ned. (1996). "What is functionalism?" a revised version of the entry on functionalism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan. (PDF online (頁面存檔備份,存於網際網路檔案館))
- ^ Lewis, David. (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain". In Block (1980a) Vol. 1, pp. 216–222.
- ^ Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP.
推薦閱讀
[編輯]- Armstrong, D.M. (1968). A Materialistic Theory of the Mind. London: RKP.
- Baron-Cohen S.; Leslie A.; Frith U. Does the Autistic Child Have a "Theory of Mind"?. Cognition. 1985, 21: 37–46. PMID 2934210. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8.
- Block, Ned. (1980a). "Introduction: What Is Functionalism?" in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Block, Ned. (1980b). "Troubles With Functionalism", in Block (1980a).
- Block, Ned. (1994). Qualia. In S. Guttenplan (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell
- Block, Ned. What is functionalism? (PDF). a revised version of the entry on functionalism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan. 1996 [2020-02-24]. (原始內容存檔 (PDF)於2017-12-30).
- Block, Ned and Fodor, J. (1972). "What Psychological States Are Not". Philosophical Review 81.
- Chalmers, David. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Crabb, B.G. (2005). "Fading and Dancing Qualia - Moving and Shaking Arguments", Deunant Books.
- DeLancey, C. (2002). "Passionate Engines - What Emotions Reveal about the Mind and Artificial Intelligence." Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dennett, D. (1990) Quining Qualia. In W. Lycan, (ed), Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwells
- Levin, Janet. (2004). "Functionalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), E. Zalta (ed.). (online(頁面存檔備份,存於網際網路檔案館))
- Lewis, David. (1966). "An Argument for the Identity Theory". Journal of Philosophy 63.
- Lewis, David. (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain". In Block (1980a) Vol. 1, pp. 216–222.
- Lycan, W. (1987) Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Mandik, Pete. (1998). Fine-grained Supervience, Cognitive Neuroscience, and the Future of Functionalism.
- Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A Computational Approach. San Francisco: Freeman & Co.
- Polgar, T. D. Functionalism. 2008 [2020-02-24]. (原始內容存檔於2019-05-19).
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被忽略 (幫助) - Putnam, Hilary. (1960). "Minds and Machines". Reprinted in Putnam (1975a).
- Putnam, Hilary. (1967). "Psychological Predicates". In Art, Mind, and Religion, W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (eds.), pp. 37–48. (Later published as "The Nature of Mental States" in Putnam (1975a).
- Putnam, Hilary. (1975a). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: CUP.
- Searle, John. Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1980, 3 (3): 417–424. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756.
- Smart, J.J.C. (1959). "Sensations and Brain Processes". Philosophical Review LXVIII.
外部連結
[編輯]![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fa/Wikibooks-logo.svg/40px-Wikibooks-logo.svg.png)
維基教科書中的相關電子教學:Consciousness studies
- Levin, Janet. Functionalism. 扎爾塔, 愛德華·N (編). 《史丹佛哲学百科全书》.
- Dictionary of the Philosophy of Mind(頁面存檔備份,存於網際網路檔案館)
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